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Case: CR-2000-0000260 Current Judge: John R. Stegner
Defendant: Shackelford, Dale Carter
Selected Items

State of Idaho vs. Dale Carter Shackelford
Judge

Date

Code

User

3/29/2011

ORDR

BETH

Order Appointing Counsel For Defendant

John R. Stegner

4/1/2011

AFFD

BETH

Affidavit for Legal Services

John R. Stegner

4/6/2011

ORDR

TERRY

Order

John R. Stegner

5/3/2011

AFFD

SUE

Affidavit for Legal Services

John R. Stegner

5/4/2011

HRSC

TERRY

Hearing Scheduled (Status 05/11/2011 10:00
AM)

John R. Stegner

ORDR

TERRY

Order Setting Status Conference

John R. Stegner

ORDR

SUE

Order

John R. Stegner

DCHH

TERRY

Hearing result for Status held on 05/11/2011
10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Sheryl L. Engler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 15 pages

John R. Stegner

CTMN

TERRY

Hearing result for Status held on 05/11/2011
10:00 AM: Court Minutes

John R. Stegner

HRSC

TERRY

Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/13/2011 03:00
PM)

John R. Stegner

6/2/2011

AFFD

MAGGIE

Affidavit

John R. Stegner

6/3/2011

ORDR

MAGGIE

Order

John R. Stegner

6/7/2011

STIP

SUE

Stipulation to Continue

John R. Stegner

6/8/2011

CONT

TERRY

Continued (Status 06/20/2011 03:00 PM)

John R. Stegner

ORDR

SUE

Order Continuing Status Conference

John R. Stegner

NOTC

SUE

Notice of State's Decision to Not Seek Death
Penalty on Resentencing

John R. Stegner

DCHH

TERRY

Hearing result for Status held on 06/20/2011
03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Sheryl L. Engler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than ten pages

John R. Stegner

CTMN

TERRY

Hearing result for Status held on 06/20/2011
03:00 PM: Court Minutes

John R. Stegner

HRSC

TERRY

Hearing Scheduled (Status 07/01/2011 09:00
AM)

John R. Stegner

6/22/2011

MOTN

SUE

Motion to Disqualify Judge w/o Cause

John R. Stegner

6/23/2011

OBJC

MAGGIE

Objection to defendant's motion to disqualify
judge without cause

John R. Stegner

6/30/2011

ORDR

SUE

Order Denying Motion to Disqualify Judge Without John R. Stegner
Cause

7/1/2011

DCHH

TERRY

Hearing result for Status scheduled on
John R. Stegner
07/01/2011 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Sheryl L. Engler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 15 pages

5/11/2011

6/20/2011
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Case: CR-2000-0000260 Current Judge: John R. Stegner
Defendant: Shackelford, Dale Carter
Selected Items

State of Idaho vs. Dale Carter Shackelford
Date

Code

User

7/1/2011

CTMN

TERRY

Hearing result for Status scheduled on
07/01/2011 09:00 AM: Court Minutes

John R. Stegner

7/6/2011

HRSC

TERRY

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 08/26/2011
09:00 AM)

John R. Stegner

7/7/2011

AFFD

SUE

Affidavit for Legal Services

John R. Stegner

7/8/2011

ORDR

SUE

Order

John R. Stegner

7/12/2011

ORDR

TERRY

Order for Update to Presentence Report

John R. Stegner

7/25/2011

RSPN

SUE

Defendant's Response to Notice of Stat'es
Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on
Resentencing

John R. Stegner

7/26/2011

CONT

TERRY

Continued (Sentencing 08/26/2011 10:00 AM)
IN OROFINO

John R. Stegner

7/28/2011

ORDR

TERRY

Order Scheduling Resentencing

John R. Stegner

8/1/2011

REPL

SUE

Reply to Defendant's Response to Notice of
State's Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on
Resentencing

John R. Stegner

8/3/2011

MOTN

SUE

Defendant's Motion for Disqualification for Cause John R. Stegner

AFFD

SUE

Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Defendant's
Motion Disqualification

John R. Stegner

BREF

SUE

Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Disqualification for Cause

John R. Stegner

AFFD

SUE

Affidavit for Legal Services

John R. Stegner

ORDR

SUE

Order

John R. Stegner

ADDM

SUE

Addendum To Presentence Report

John R. Stegner

MISC

SUE

******************START ED Fl LE

John R. Stegner

8/5/2011

Judge

#16******************

8/9/2011

MOTN

SUE

Motion for Continuance of Sentencing Hearing

John R. Stegner

8/11/2011

RSPN

SUE

Response to Defendant's Motion for
Disqualification for Cause

John R. Stegner

STIP

SUE

Stipulation RE: Response to Presentence
Investigation Report

John R. Stegner

HRSC

TERRY

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/23/2011 09:00
AM) Motion to Disqualify
Motion to Continue Sentencing

John R. Stegner

NTHR

SUE

Notice Of Hearing

John R. Stegner

NTHR

SUE

Notice Of Hearing

John R. Stegner

ORDR

TERRY

Order for Transport

John R. Stegner

OBJC

MAGGIE

Objection (D) and responses to presentence
investigation and witness list

John R. Stegner

8/23/2011
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Defendant: Shackelford, Dale Carter
Selected Items
State of Idaho vs. Dale Carter Shackelford
Date

Code

User

8/26/2011

DCHH

TERRY

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
John R. Stegner
08/26/2011 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Sheryl L. Engler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages
Motion to Disqualify

CTMN

TERRY

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
08/26/2011 10:00 AM: Court Minutes IN
OROFINO
Motion to Disqualify

John R. Stegner

HRSC

TERRY

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 09/28/2011
10:00 AM) TO BE CONDUCTED IN OROFINO

John R. Stegner

9/6/2011

AFFD

BETH

Affidavit for Legal Services

John R. Stegner

9/8/2011

SUBR

BETH

Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned - Jackye
Squire Leonard

John R. Stegner

ORDR

BETH

Order for Legal Services

John R. Stegner

SUE

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any John R. Stegner
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by:
schnapp, fall, silvey Receipt number: 0188357
Dated: 9/12/2011 Amount: $8.00 (Cashiers
Check)

MOTN

BETH

Motion for a Specific Sentence

NTHR

SUE

Notice Of Hearing - September 28, 2011 10 am in John R. Stegner
Orofino

9/21/2011

SUBR

BETH

Subpoena Returned - Jackye Squire-Leonard

John R. Stegner

9/26/2011

ADDM

BETH

Addendum To the Updated Presentence Report

John R. Stegner

ORDR

TERRY

Order for Transport

John R. Stegner

9/27/2011

MEMO

BETH

Sentencing Memorandum

John R. Stegner

9/28/2011

DCHH

TERRY

Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on
John R. Stegner
09/28/2011 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Sheryl L. Engler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 130 pages

CTMN

·TERRY

Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on
09/28/2011 10:00 AM: Court Minutes TO BE
CONDUCTED IN OROFINO

John R. Stegner

MISC

TERRY

Request to Obtain Approval to Video Record,
Broadcast or Photograph a Court Proceeding

John R. Stegner

10/4/2011

AFFD

BETH

Affidavit for Legal Services

John R. Stegner

10/5/2011

ORDR

SUE

Order - Legal Services

John R. Stegner

10/6/2011

JDCN

BETH

Judgment Of Conviction on Resentencing Counts I and II

John R. Stegner

i0/7/2011

AFFD

SUE

Affidavit for Legal Services (Amended)

John R. Stegner

10/12/2011

ORDR

SUE

Order (Amended)

John R. Stegner

10/20/2011

NAPL

SUE

Notice Of Appeal

John R. Stegner

9/12/2011

9/13/2011

Judge

John R. Stegner
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Case: CR-2000-0000260 Current Judge: John R. Stegner
Defendant: Shackelford, Dale Carter
Selected Items

State of Idaho vs. Dale Carter Shackelford
Date

Code

User

10/20/2011

MOTN

SUE

Motion to Appoint State Appellate Public Defender John R. Stegner

10/21/2011

ORDR

BETH

Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender John R. Stegner

11/3/2011

AFFD

BETH

Affidavit for Legal Services

John R. Stegner

11/4/2011

ORDR

BETH

Order (Legal Services)

John R. Stegner

12/2/2011

MISC

RANAE

S.C. - Notice of Appeal Filed (T)

John R. Stegner

MISC

RANAE

S.C. - Clerk's Certificate Filed

John R. Stegner

AFFD

SUE

Affidavit for Legal Services

John R. Stegner

12/6/2011
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IN

DISTRICT OF

DISTRICT COURT
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
v.

DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.

COUNTY
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2000-260

ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL
FOR DEFENDANT

~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)

Dale Carter Shackelford was formerly represented at public expense by
Donald Ray Barker. The case has recently been remanded for a sentencing hearing
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515. Consequently, the defendant needs counsel to represent
him. Good cause appearing,
IT IS ORDERED that Donald Ray Barker is appointed to represent the
defendant in this case.
DATED this

zg~y of March 2011.

r~~

J~n R. Stegner
District Judge

ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT - 1

010

OF.SERVICE
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete and correct copies of the foregoing
ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT were delivered to
following as indicated:

~U.S. Mail

·Donald Ray Barker
PO Box 9408
Moscow, ID 83843
FAX: (208) 882-7604

[ ] Hand Delivery
[]Fax
[ ] Hand Delivery
[]U.S. Mail
[] Hand Delivery

William Wofford Thompson
Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843

,J}h::d Delivery

~.S.Mail

Dale C. Shackelford
#64613/ IMSI I Unit J
P.O. Box 51
Boise, ID 83707
On this

[] Hand Delivery
[]Fax
[ ] Hand Delivery

~y of March 2011.
Latah Cou
By:~~~-=--'!-=:..~~~.L--J!!:Y-=-L-~~~

Deputy Clerk

ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT - 2

011

SECOND JUDICIAL
THE COUNTY

IN
OF

MINUTES
Sheryl L. Engler
Court Reporter
Recording: Z:3/2011-05-ll
Time: 10:00 AM.

John R. Stegner
District Judge
Date: May 11, 2011
STATE OF

Plaintiff,
vs.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.
Subject of Proceedings:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

CR-2000-00260

APPEARANCES:
William W. Thompson, ., Prosecutor
Appearing on behalf of the State
Defendant not present, represented by
D. Ray Barker, Moscow, ID

STATUS CONFERENCE

This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for conducting a status
review following the Supreme Court's filing of the Remittitur in this case, Court noted
the presence of counsel and the absence of the defendant.
In response to inquiry from the Court, Mr. Thompson informed the Court that
the State has not yet decided whether to seek the death penalty in this case, stating
that the State was in the process of trying to locate potential witnesses. Mr.
Thompson requested one month to make that decision. There being no objection from
the defendant, Court so allowed, scheduling a further status conference in this case for
3:00 P.M. on June 13, 2011. Court stated that it would expect the State to have made
its decision of whether or not it intends to seek the death penalty by that date.
Court informed Mr. Barker that it deemed it premature at this time to add
second counsel for the defendant. Mr. Barker concurred. Court stated that it would
revisit that matter ifthe State decides to seek the death penalty. Mr. Barker informed
the Court that he had contacted Steve Mahaffy, second counsel during the trial of this
case, as possibly serving as second counsel if the State decides to seek the death
penalty.
Upon motion of Mr. Barker, there being no objection from the State, Court
Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
COURTMINUTES-1

012

the release of copies of the Presentence Report

both

. Barker moved that a money judge be appointed. Court
. Mr. Thompson
to prepare an
serve as
money judge in this case. Colloquy was
Court stated that it would contact Judge Kerrick to determine
case.
recessed at 10:08 AM.
APPROVED

c1

t

JOHNR.
DISTRICT

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
COURT MINUTES - 2

013

LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568
Phone: (208)883-2246
ISB No. 2613

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
;

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.

)
)
)
)

DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.

)
)
)

Case No. CR-00-00260
NOTICE OF STATE'S
DECISION TO NOT SEEK
DEATH PENALTY ON
RESENTENCING

COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through the Latah County Prosecuting
Attorney, and hereby gives notice to Court and counsel of its decision to not seek the death
penalty at the resentencing on Counts I and II ordered by the Idaho Supreme Court in its
substitute opinion dated June 1, 2010.
On December 22, 2.000, following a jury trial that began the preceding October 16,
defendant Dale Carter Shackelford was convicted by unanimous jury verdict of the
following offenses:
NOTICE OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH
PENALTY ON RESENTENCING: Page -1-

Count I - Murder in the First Degree of Donna Fontaine
Count II- Murder in the First Degree of Fred Palahniuk
Count III - Arson in the First Degree
Count IV - Conspiracy to Commit Murder in the First Degree
Count V - Conspiracy to Commit Arson in the First Degree
Count VI - Preparing False Evidence
Subsequently, in accordance with then-exi?ting law, the Honorable John R. Stegner,
District Judge, imposed the death penalty on counts I and II. The Court also imposed the
following sentences on the remaining counts: Arson in the First Degree - 25 years fixed
(wit~out

the possibility of parole); Conspiracy to Commit Murder in the First Degree -

fixed life (without the possibility of parole); Conspiracy to Commit Arson in the First
Degree - 25 years fixed (without the possibility of parole); and Preparing False Evidence -5
years fixed (without the possibility of parole). These sentences were handed down on
.

.

October 25, 2001, following an additional six days of evidentiary hearing and substantial
briefing, submission of exhibits and argument by counsel.
The defendant then pursued post conviction and appellate relief culminating in the
Idaho Supreme Court's June 1, 2010, substitute opinion upholding his convictions on all six
counts, and upholding the sentences on counts III, IV, V and VI. However, the death
sentences imposed in Counts I and II were set aside based on the intervening decision of
the United States Supreme Courtin Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) which established
a new requirement that a jury must find statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a
NOTICE OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH
PENALTY ON RESENTENCING: Page -2-

015

reasonable doubt in order for the death penalty to be imposed. In applying the Ring
decision retroactively to this case, the Idaho Supreme Court chose to reject the argument.
that the original trial jury had already found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of two murders occurring at the same time (counts I and II), and remanded the case
with a requirement that the State reprove that aggravating factor if it wished to continue
pursuit of the death penalty. This, despite the trial and sentencing judge having previously
determined that the jury verdicts on counts I and II "conclusively establishes this statutory
aggravating factor." Findings of the Court in Considering Death Penalty, October 25, 2001,
at 15 and 31.
Although the Idaho legislature amended its death penalty statutes to conform to the
new procedures required by the Ring decision, considered analysis of the Idaho Supreme
Court's application of Ring in this case suggests that despite the Idaho legislature's
determination that the death penalty is a viable and available sanction in appropriate cases,
appellate courts will likely continue to effectively heighten the standards for effectuating a
death sentence beyond the statutory requirements established by the legislature. Even
more, the virtually endless post conviction and appellate review would likely continue to
frustrate any reasonable possibility of honoring the intent of the Idaho legislature and the
verdicts of a resentencing jury.

NOTICE OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH
PENALTY ON RESENTENCING: Page -3-
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Although it is, indeed, frustrating to the State, the survivingvictims and, possibly to
some extent the Court itself, that despite us following the rule of law throughout the trial
and first sentencing,

appellate courts have seen fit to change the rules after the fact; that

is the reality of the American criminal justice system and the State accepts it as such.
In this case, the State is left with the unfortunate conclusion that it is unlikely a death
penalty will be imposed in this case absent essentially re-trying the entire matter to a new
jury. The State has exhaustively reviewed the Supreme Court's decision and the evidence
that would have to be adduced to es9entially reprove counts I and II to a new jury. As part
of this review, the State has undertaken locating witnesses from the original trial.
Although most have been located, many of them reside out of state and as far away as the
eastern United States. To reproduce all of these witnesses would necessarily involve
substantial effort, the cooperation of the Courts of other jurisdictions to compel their
attendance, and the incurring of substantial public expense for the witnesses to repeat
testimony already given in a lengthy trial that led to unanimous jury verdicts of guilt.
The State has also contacted various individuals including the original prosecutors,
key law enforcement investigative personnel and the dedicated staff of the Capital Crimes
Division of the Idaho Attorney General's Office; and the State has solicited input from the
living victims - the survivors of Donna Fontaine and Fred Palahniuk.

NOTICE OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH
PENALTY ON RESENTENCING: Page -4-

017

In addition, there are practical considerations that include a County Prosecutor's
fiscal responsibility obligations. Contrary to popular misconceptions (frequently touted by
some Courts and defense couriset among others), the State does not have the benefit of
unlimited resources at its disposal. In fact, in many instances it appears that Court
appointed defense counsel have much more ready access to judicial authorizations to
spend public monies - unfettered by any direct responsibility to the tax payers. Although
fiscal ramifications most certainly do not and should not control a prosecutorial decision,
consideration of them is inherently necessary in making a reasoned and responsible
decis.ion.
Above all, the primary goal of the criminal justice system, and the duty of law
enforcement and prosecutors, is the good order and protection of society. In the current
case, the defendant is already serving a fixed life sentence without the possibility of parole
· on the Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder charge (count IV), and that conviction
and sentence have been sustained through the appellate process. Absent some gross
· dereliction by the Idaho Department of Correction which would allow the defendant to
escape custody (highly unlikely), society is essentially protected from Dale Carter
Shackelford forever.
Consequently, the State has determined that the overriding goal of the Idaho
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Criminal Justice System (protection of society) can most likely and best be accomplished in
this case by insuring the defendant spends the rest of his natural life in prison and, at the
same time, avoiding the wasteful and costly repetition of a lengthy and complex trial and
the interminable delays and lack of closure resulting from capital sentence reviews and
appeals. For all of these reasons, the State hereby gives notice that it elects to not seek the
death penalty at resentencing on either count I or count II, and based on the entire record
in this case, including the trial testimony and original sentencing proceedings, and such
further proceedings as the Court deems proper, respectfully prays that the Court impose
consecutive sentences of fixed life on each count.

-J__

Respectfully submitted this

2.b

.

day of June, 2011.

Willlam W. Thom~s01\Jr.
Prosecuting Atton1~
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
_I

hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of State's

Decision to Not Seek the Death Penalty on Resentencing was:
__ mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid
hand delivered
/sent by facsimile - 882-7604
to the following:
D. Ray Barker
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, ID 83843
Dated this JO't-h day of June, 2011.
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DISTRICT COURT
THE STATE

COURT MINUTES

John R. Stegner
District Judge

Sheryl Engler
Court Reporter
Recording: Z:S/2011-06-20
Time: 3:05 P.M.

Date: June 20, 2011

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

CR-2000-00260

APPEARANCES:
William W. Thompson, Jr., Prosecutor
Appearing on behalf of the State
Defendant not present, represented by
D. Ray Barker, Moscow, ID

------------------------------------------------------------------------~---------------------------------------------------

Subject of Proceedings:

STATUS CONFERENCE

This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for conducting a status
conference in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the absence of the
defendant.
Court noted for the record that the State has filed a Notice of State's Decision to
Not Seek Death Penalty on Resentencing.
In response to inquiries from the Court, Mr. Barker stated that he is meeting
with the defendant this week and requested that the Court fix another status
conference in about week to schedule a date for resentencing.
Court scheduling another status conference for 9:00 AM. on July 1, 2011, at
which time a date for resentencing will be set.
Mr. Thompson stated had spoken to legal counsel for the Idaho State Board of
Correction regarding resentencing the defendant at the maximum security facility in
Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
COURTMINUTES-1
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had no objection.
the resentencing in Boise.

Boise, Idaho, for
stated that

recessed

3:08

APPROVED BY:

STEGNER
DISTRICT JUDGE

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk

COURTMINUTES-2
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D. RAY BARKER
Attorney at Law
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 1380
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-00-00260
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE
WITHOUT CAUSE

COMES NOW the Defendant, Dale C. Shackelford, by and through his attorney
of record, D. Ray Barker, and moves the Court for an order disqualifying the Honorable
Judge John R. Stegner without cause pursuant to Rule 25(a) Idaho Criminal Rules.

D. Ray ~rker
Attorney for Respondent

Motion Disqualify Judge
Without Cause - 1.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thei<;l-., 16(~ay of June, 2011, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, and
addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of the
office of or serving by facsimile:
William C. Thompson
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843
[] ·

f<l
[1

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

D. Ray 8cyl<er -- .
Attorney et Law
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Without Cause - 2
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LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR.
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568
Phone: (208)883-2246
ISB No. 2613

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-00-00260
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S
"MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
JUDGE WITHOUT CA USE1'

~~~~~~~~-)

COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through the Latah County Prosecuting
Attorney, and objects to the defendant's 11 Motion to Disqualify Judge without Cause" filed
herein on June 22, 2011.
The defendant, by his said motion, seeks an order pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
25(a) to disqualify the Honorable John R. Stegner without cause. Idaho Criminal Rule
25(a)(2) provides:
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S
"MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE
WITHOUTCAUSE": Page-1-
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"A motion for disqualification without cause must be filed not later than
seven (7) days after service of a written notice setting the action for status
conference, pre-trial conference, trial or for hearing on the first contested
motion, or not later than fourteen (14) days after the service of a written
notice specifying who the presiding judge or magistrate to the action will
be, whichever occurs first; and such motion must be filed before the
commencement of a status conference, a pre-trial conference, a contested
proceeding or trial in the action. 11
Following numerous pre-trfal proceedings and contested motions, this case went
to trial on October 16, 2000, culminating in jury verdicts on December 22 2000. The
1

case subsequently has undergone post-conviction scrutiny and appellate scrutiny
resulting in the Idaho Supreme Court's substitute opinion dated June 1 2010, upholding
1

the defendant's convictions on all six felony counts, and upholding the sentences on
counts III, IV, V and VI. The case has now been remanded to the District Court for
resentencing on counts I and II. Throughout this time, the Honorable John R. Stegner
has been the presiding District Judge. Although the case has been remanded for
resentencing on counts I and II, Idaho Criminal Rule 25(a)(5) specifically states that "a
remand of a case for sentencing or resentencing does not reinstate the right to one
disqualification without cause under this subparagraph (which allows an additional
disqualification without cause in the event a new trial is ordered)."

OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S
"MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE
WITHOUT CAUSE": Page -2-
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Based on the above, the defendant's June 22, 2011, "Motion to Disqualify Judge
Without Cause" is untimely and should be denied.
Dated this

OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S
"MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE
WITHOUT CAUSE": Page -3-
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to
Defendant's "Motion To Disqualify Judge Without Cause" was:
__ mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid
hand delivered
/_,

~/ sent by facsimile - 882-7604

to the following:
D. Ray Barker
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, ID 83843
Dated this .•;i?>'d day of June, 2011.
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE DISTRICT COURT
THE

OF

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
v.

DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.

AND FOR THE COUNTY
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2000-260

ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE
WITHOUT CAUSE

~~~~~~~~~)

This case, consisting of six criminal counts against the defendant, Dale
Carter Shackelford ("Shackelford"), began in 2000. It proceeded through trial,
sentencing, and post-conviction review. An appeal was heard by the Idaho Supreme
Court. · The case has now been remanded to this Court for resentencing on two
counts of first degree murder. On remand, Shackelford filed a Motion to Disqualify
Judge Without Cause pursuant to I.C.R. Rule 25(a).
"Idaho Criminal Rule 25(a) provides that each party in a criminal action has
a right to disqualify one judge without cause, provided the moving party complies
with the procedures set forth in the rule." State v. Larios, 129 Idaho 631, 633, 931
ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE
WITHOUT CAUSE

Page 1
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P.2d 625, 627 (1997). According to I.C.R. Rule 25(a)(5), this right is reinstated if a
new trial is ordered but "a remand of a case for sentencing or resentencing does not
reinstate the right to one disqualification without cause .... " In Larios, the court
reasoned that a sentencing is simply "an ongoing part of the original proceeding"
and that "no right of automatic disqualification" is reinstated upon remand for such
a proceeding. 129 Idaho at 633, 931 P.2d at 627.
Because this case has been remanded to this Court for resentencing, the
defendant has no right to automatic disqualification. As a result, it is ORDERED
that Shackelford's Motion to Disqualify Judge Without Cause is DENIED.
DATED this

3o~ay of June 2011.

~Y\Q~

Jo~ R. Stegner
District Judge

ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE
WITHOUT CAUSE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete and correct copies of the foregoing
were delivered to the following as indicated:
Donald Ray Barker
PO Box 9408
Moscow, ID 83843
FAX: (208) 882-7604

[]U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[]Fax
H- Hand Delivery

William Wofford Thompson Jr.
Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843

[]U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[]Fax
H Hand Delivery

Dale C. Shackelford
#64613/ IMSI I Unit J
P.O. Box 51
Boise, ID 83707

[..-]U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[]Fax
[ ] Hand Delivery

On this

'\
U

day of June 2011.
.

h Mmmtv

il

~;~a~ c5{3f{hlf;trla d\IL .
'l

Deprlty Clerk
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COURT MINUTES

Sheryl Engler
Court Reporter
Recording: Z:3/201
Time: 9:03

Stegner
District Judge
1,2011

STATE OF IDAHO,
· Plaintiff,
vs.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.
Subject of Proceedings:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.
APPEARANCES:
William W. Thompson,
Prosecutor
Appearing on behalf of the State
Defendant not present, represented by
D. Ray Barker, Moscow, ID

STATUS CONFERENCE

This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for conducting a status
conference in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the absence of the
defendant.
In response to inquiry from the Court, Mr. Thompson stated that counsel are
prepared to have the resentencing scheduled. Mr. Thompson requested that the Court
order an update to the Presentence Report.
Mr. Barker requested that this sentencing be delayed six months and argued in
support of that. Mr. Barker moved that the defendant be transported to the facility in
Orofino to give him better access. Court stated that it does not have the authority to
order the Idaho State Board of Correction where to house the defendant.
Court ordered that an update to the Presentence Report be completed by the
Department of Correction and report filed with the Court and served upon counsel no
later than August 5, 2011. If the defendant intends to offer any testimony or other
Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
COURT MINUTES - 1
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evidence
Barker shall so
August 12, 2011.

the information
State and the

Presentence Report,
5:00

on

response to inquiry
the
counsel had objection to
conducting this hearing at the state facillty in Boise. Court scheduled resentencing for
9:00 A.M. on August 26, 2011, at the state facility Boise.
Court stated
penitentiary in Boise.
Court recessed

it would make

to use

courtroom at the

9: 12 A.M.

BY:

STEGNER
DISTRICT JUDGE

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
COURT MINUTES - 2

...
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
STATE OF
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AND
)
)
)
)
)

THE COUNTY OF

.Case No. CR-2000-260
ORDER FOR UPDATE TO
PRESENTENCE REPORT

)
)

DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,

)
)

Defendant.

)

~~~~~~~~~)

It is ORDERED that an update to the Presentence Report shall be prepared by
the Department .of Correction of the State of Idaho and ~hall be filed with the clerk of
the above entitled Court not later than, August 5, 2011, together with two (2) copies
of the report - one of which shall be delivered by the clerk to the Latah County
Prosecuting Attorney and the other of which shall be delivered by the clerk to defense
counsel; and
In the event defendant desires to rebut or explain any information contained in
the update to' the presentence investigation report, his counsel shall, no later than
5:00 P.M. on August 12, 2011, file with the clerk of the court a written notice setting
forth with particularity those portions of the presentence investigation report which
defendant intends to rebut or explain and shall concurrently serve a copy upon the
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney.
DATED this

{Z ~of July 2011.

~~C)~

Joh R. Stegner
District Judge

'"" ... "'~.LA,..,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that a full, true
complete and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER was transmitted by facsimile to:
D. RAY BARKER
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
882-7604
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
DIVISION OF PAROLE AND PROBATION
PO BOX1408
LEWISTON ID 83501
208-799-8556
and hand delivered to:
William W. Thompson, Jr.
. Prosecuting Attorney
on this

_/L~y of July 201
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D. RAY BARKER
Attorney at Law
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 1380
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-00-00260
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO
NOTICE OF STATE'S DECISION
TO NOT SEEK DEATH PENALTY
ON RESENTENCING

Defendant.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)

COMES NOW the Defendant, Dale C. Shackelford, by and through his attorney
of record, D. Ray Barker, and responds to the Notice of State's Decision to Not Seek
Death Penalty on Resentencing, filed herein on June 20, 2011.
Idaho Code 19-2515(5)(a) provides as follows:

If a person is adjudicated guilty of murder in the first degree,
whether by acceptance of a plea of guilty, by verdict of a
jury, or by decision of the trial court sitting without a jury, and
a notice of intent to seek the death penalty was filed and
served as provided in section 18-4004A, Idaho Code, a
special sentencing proceeding shall be held promptly for the
Defendant's Response to Notice of State's
Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on
Resentencing - 1
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purpose of hearing all relevant evidence and arguments of
counsel in aggravation and mitigation of the offense ... The
special sentencing procedure shall be conducted before a
jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant with the
consent of the prosecuting attorney.
In this case, Mr. Shackelford was adjudicated guilty of murder in the first degree
and a notice of intent to seek the death penalty was filed and served as provided in
Section 18-4004A. Therefore, a special sentencing proceeding should be held for the
purpose of hearing all relevant evidence and arguments of counsel in aggravation and
mitigation of the offense and the special sentencing proceeding should be conducted
before a jury unless a jury is waived by the Defendant with the consent of the
prosecuting attorneys. The Defendant has not waived a jury.
The State, by filing the Notice of State's Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on
Resentencing on June 20, 2011, has attempted to undo or remove the effects of its prior
filing of a Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty. Pursuant to Idaho Code 18-4004
A, a notice of intent to seek the death penalty may be withdrawn at any time prior to the
imposition of sentence.

Dale Shackelford has now been in prison on death row in

excess of ten years. It is difficult to conclude that his sentence has no,t already been
imposed.
The Notice of State's Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on Resentencing was
filed long after the imposition of sentence.

Whether or not the State can undo or

reverse the effect of the filing of the Notice to Seek the Death Penalty does not resolve
the real issue which is whether the court can make factual findings that have the effect
Defendant's Response to Notice of State's
Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on
Resentencing - 2

..

03

of increasing a sentence which may be imposed on Mr. Shackelford. Subsections a, b,
and c of Idaho Code 19-2515(7) provide as follows:
The jury shall be informed as follows:
(a) If the jury finds that a statutory aggravating circumstance
exists and no mitigating circumstances exist which would
make the imposition of the death penalty unjust, the
defendant will be sentenced to death by the court.
(b)
If the jury finds the existence of a statutory
aggravating circumstance but finds that the existence of
mitigating circumstances makes the imposition of the death
penalty unjust or the jury cannot unanimously agree on
whether the existence of mitigating circumstances makes the
imposition of the death penalty unjust, the defendant will be
sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole; and
(c)
If the jury does not find the existence of a statutory
aggravating circumstance or if the jury cannot unanimously
agree on the existence of a statutory aggravating
circumstance, the defendant will be sentenced by the court
to a term of life imprisonment with a fixed term of not less
than ten (10) years.
Subsection (b) requires a finding of a statutory aggravating circumstances and
requires a weighing

of that aggravating circumstance against any mitigating

circumstances and provides that if the mitigating circumstances makes the imposition of
the death penalty unjust, or the jury can't agree that the mitigating circumstances make
the imposition of the death sentence unjust, the Defendant will be sentenced to a term
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Subsection (c) provides that if the
jury does not unanimously find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance,
then the Defendant will be sentenced by the Court to a term of life imprisonment with a
Defendant's Response to Notice of State's
Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on
Resentencing - 3
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fixed term of not less than ten (10) years. The state in its Notice of Decision Not to
Seek Death Penalty on Resentencing states that it respectfully prays that the court
impose consecutive sentences of fixed life on each count. A sentence of fixed life is the
equivalent of a term of life without the possibility of parole.
The requirement that a jury must find a statutory aggravating circumstance in
order to impose a sentence of life without parole also appears in Idaho Code § 18-4004,
which provide as follows:
If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, finds a statutory
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt but
finds that the imposition of the death penalty would be
unjust, the court shall impose a fixed life sentence. If a jury,
or the court if the jury is waived, does not find a statutory
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt or if
the death penalty is not sought, the court shall impose a life
sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not less
than ten (10) years during which period of confinement the
offender shall not be eligible for parole or discharge or credit
or deduction of sentence for good conduct, except for
meritorious service.
The above quoted statute makes it clear that a jury, unless waived, must make
. the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance in order for the court to impose a
fixed life sentence.

It is also clear that if a jury does not find a statutory aggravating

circumstance the court shall impose a life sentence with a minimum period of
confinement of not less than ten ( 10) years.
The reason this case was remanded was that due to the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Ring v. Arizona,
Defendant's Response to Notice of State's
Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on
Resentencing - 4
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536 U.S. 584 (2002), which require that any factual findings that are necessary to
enhance a sentence must be findings made by a jury. A trial judge is no longer able to
make such factual findings.
Subsection (b) of Idaho Code Section 19-2515(7) require a factual finding of a
statutory aggravating circumstance in order to impose a sentence of fixed life or life
without the possibility of parole.
The case of Blakely v. Washington 542 U.S. 296 (2004) is illustrative of the issue
presented in this case.

In Blakely, the Defendant plead guilty and admitted the

elements of second degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and the use of a
firearm but he admitted no other relevant facts.

The standard range for the offense

under the Washington Sentencing Reform Act was 49 to 53 months. Under that Act, a
judge may impose a sentence above the standard range if he finds "substantial and
compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence."

The Act lists aggravating

factors that justify such a departure. When a judge imposes an exceptional sentence
he must set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting it. In Blakely, the
trial Judge imposed a sentence of 90 months - 37 months beyond the standard
maximum and justified the sentence on the ground that Petitioner had acted with
"deliberate cruelty."
The U.S. Supreme Court stated that the case required the application of the rule
expressed in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). ·"Other than the fact of
a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
Defendant's Response to Notice of State's
Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on
Resentencing - 5
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statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt." The State contended there was no Apprendi violation because the sentence
was within the 10 years maximum for a Class B felony.

The Court stated that its

precedents makes clear that the "statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the Defendant.
In this case, the jury verdict reflected no facts other than guilt, therefore the Court
can sentence Mr. Shackelford to a term of life imprisonment with a fixed term of not less
than ten (10) years pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-2515(7)(c) but the Court cannot
sentence Mr. Shackelford to life without the possibility of parole (fixed life) unless the
factual finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance is submitted to a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
DATED this

,2 ff4

day of

tP1-:

'2011.

g)~&-Le

D. Ray Bapt<er
Attorney (or Respondent

Defendant's Response to Notice of State's
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the2sf4day of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed
to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of the office of or
serving by facsimile:
William C. Thompson
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843

~[ ]

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

D. Ray B~ er
Attorney at Law

Defendant's Response to Notice of State's
· Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on
Resentencing - 7
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

Case No. CR-2000-260

)

ORDER SCHEDULING
RESENTENCING

)
)

DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,

)
)

Defendant.

)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

It is ORDERED that the resentencing hearing in the above captioned case will
be1 conducted at the Clearwater County Courthouse commencing at 10:00 A.M. on
August 26, 2011.

f"-

DATED this '}.ff day of July 2011.

~~1+;;-

JohnR. Stegner
District Judge

ORDER SCHEDULING RESENTENCING - 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that a full, true
complete and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER SCHEDULING RESENTENCING
was transmitted by facsimile to:

D. RAY BARKER
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
882-7604
and hand delivered to:
William W. Thompson, Jr.
Prosecuting Attorney
on this

2ffay of July 20

.

~
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LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR.
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568
Phone: (208)883-2246
ISB No. 2613

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~~~~~~~~~)

Case No. CR-00-00260
REPLY TO "DEFENDANT'S
RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF
STATE'S DECISION TO NOT
SEEK DEATH PENALTY ON
RESENTENCING"

COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through the Latah County Prosecuting
Attorney, and respectfully submits the following reply to the "Defendant's Response to
Notice of State's Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on Resentencing" filed herein on July
25, 2011.
The defendant attempts to argue that this Court is without the power to impose a

REPLY TO "DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO NOTICE
OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH
PENALTY ON RESENTENCING:" Page -1-
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unified sentence of a maximum indeterminate life sentence and a fixed minimum period of
confinement of life, arguing that Idaho Code 19-2515 (as it currently exists) requires that a
jury find a statutory aggravating factor before a court can impose a "fixed life 11 sentence.
The defendant's reliance on this statute is misplaced. As the Idaho Supreme Court recently
observed in Booth v. State, Docket number 37296, June 29, 2011, (attached) Idaho Code 192515 (and 19-2515A which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on mentally
retarded persons) 11 are only applicable in capital cases." Id. at p.9. As the Supreme Court
further observed, "(t)hese statutory sections make clear that the provision in LC.§ 18-4004
requiring the jury, or the court if a jury is waived, to impose a fixed life sentence for a firstdegree murder conviction in the event that a statutory aggravating circumstance has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt applies only to those cases where the death penalty is
sought." at 10.
The only effect of Idaho Code 19-2515 is to require a mandatory fixed life sentence if
a death penalty is sought and an aggravated circumstance is proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, but the death penalty is not imposed. The statute does not change the court's
authority to impose, in its discretion, a fixed period of confinement up to life imprisonment
pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2513and18-4004 in a case where the death penalty is not being
sought.
REPLY TO "DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO NOTICE
OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH
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Idaho Code 18-4004 sets forth the minimum sentence for first degree murder: 11 a life
sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (10) years ... 11 • It does
not establish a cap on the fixed period of confinement. This is cons_istent with Idaho Code
19-2513, which provides "that the aggregate sentence shall not exceed the maximum
provided by law." As the Idaho Supreme Court observed in State v. Wolfe, 107 Idaho 676
(1984), citing to State v. Wilson, 107 Idaho 506 (1984), "if a sentence of imprisonment is
imposed for murder in the first degree it must be for life, although it may be either an
indeterminate life sentence or a fixed life sentence." at 680.
The State has elected to not seek the death penalty at the upcoming resentencing.
Consequently, Idaho Code 19-2515 does not apply and the court has the legal authority to
impose a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of life under Idaho Code 192513 and 18-8004.
The defendant's reliance on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), is also
misplaced. In Blakely, Washington state law provided for a specific sentencing range for
the underlying offense and required additional "substantial and compelling reasons" to
justify a sentence above the standard range. Idaho does not have a similar mandatory
sentencing range, nor does it have a statutory requirement for aggravating factors to
increase a sentence that is otherwise within the maximum range provided by statute.
REPLY TO "DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO NOTICE
OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH
PENALTY ON RESENTENCING:" Page -3-
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Based on the above, the State respectfully prays that the Court, at the conclusion of
the resentencing hearing herein, impose consecutive life sentences with minimum periods
of confinement of life on each count of first degree murder.

Wi liam W. Thomp~
Prosecuting Attorne

REPLY TO "DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO NOTICE
OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH
PENALTY ON RESENTENCING:" Page -4-
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply to "Defendant's
Response to Notice of State's Decision to Not Seek the Death Penalty on Resentencing" was:
__. mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid
hand delivered
__ sent by facsimile - 882-7604
to the following:
D. Ray Barker
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, ID 83843
Dated this 15 t-

day of August, 2011.
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J. JONES, Justice.
The State ofidaho appeals the district court's order granting Trevor Booth's petition for
post-conviction relief on the ground that Booth received ineffective assistance of counsel. We
affirm.

I.
Factual and Procedural Background
On January 16, 2005, Leonard Kellum died .as a result of multiple gunshot wounds that he
sustained at his residence. After an investigation, law enforcement suspected that Trevor Booth
was responsible for the shooting. Law enforcement based this conclusion on several pieces of
evidence obtained during the investigation. First, law enforcement determined that the perpetrator
had entered Kellum's residence through the back door and shot him five times using an improvised
silencer made out of a plastic soda bottle. Law enforcement found a single set of footprints leading
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from the back door of Kellum's residence to the street, where neighbors said a black pickup truck
was parked at the time of the shooting. Booth, who owned a black pickup truck, told law
enforcement that he had driven to Kellum's residence on the morning Kellum was shot to pick up
marijuana that he planned to sell. Booth claimed he parked his pickup truck on the street and
approached the front door of the residence where he heard screaming and gunshots. Booth told law
enforcement that he left the residence after hearing the shots. However, before Kellum passed
away, he was transported to the hospital where he identified Booth as the person who had shot him.
Booth was subsequently charged with first-degree murder, and was represented by Richard
Harris. Although the crime of first-degree murder carries a potential penalty of death, 1 the State
declined to file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, thereby establishing that Booth's case
was a non-capital case. 2 During the time the case was pending, Harris met with Booth periodically
to discuss Booth's version of the events leading up to Kellum's death. Although Booth initially
maintained that he did not commit the offense, he eventually acknowledged that he killed Kellum,
but asserted he did so in order to defend himself and his family. Booth told Harris that he was
actively involved in selling controlled substances and Kellum was his supplier. Booth explained
that he eventually fell behind in paying Kellum for the drugs he had supplied, and Kellum began
making threats of physical violence towards Booth, his family, and his girlfriend if he did not pay
the money owed.
Prior to trial, Gearld Wolff, the prosecutor handling Booth's case, informed Harris that he
intended to file a motion requesting that the Court provide a special verdict form to be used by the
jury if Booth was convicted of first-degree murder. Specifically, the proposed verdict form would
instruct the jury to determine whether certain statutory aggravating circumstances delineated in I.C.

§ 19-2515(9) 3 existed, including whether (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, .
manifesting exceptional depravity; (2) by the murder, or circumstances surrounding its

1

According to I.C. § 19-2515(1),
Except as provided in section 19-2515A, Idaho Code, a person convicted of murder in the first
degree shall be liable for the imposition of the penalty of death if such person killed, intended a
killing, or acted with reckless indifference to human life, irrespective of whether such person
·ctirectly committed the acts that caused death.
All statutory citations in this opinion will refer to those in effect at the time that Booth's criminal case was pending.
2
Pursuant to LC.§ 19-2515(3)(a), a defendant convicted of a crime that is punishable by death cannot be sentenced
to death unless the State files a notice of intent to seek the death penalty.
3
I.C. § 19-2515(9) sets forth the list of statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which must be found to exist
beyond a reasonable doubt, before a sentence of death can be imposed.
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commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life; or (3) the defendant, by prior
conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit
murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society. Wolff communicated to
Harris his understanding that pursuant to LC. § 18-4004, the statute dealing with the penalties for
first-degree murder, the State could seek an instruction regarding statutory aggravating
circumstances even in a non-capital case. LC. § 18-40044 provides,
Subject to the provisions of sections 19-2515 and l 9-2515A, Idaho Code, every
person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be punished by death or by
imprisonment for life, provided that a sentence of death shall not be imposed
unless the prosecuting attorney filed written notice of intent to seek the death
penalty as required under the provisions of section 18-4004A, Idaho Code, and
provided further that whenever the death penalty is not imposed the court shall
impose a sentence. If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, finds a statutory
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt but finds that the imposition
of the death penalty would be unjust, the court shall impose a fixed life sentence.
If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, does not find a statutory aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt or if the death penalty is not sought, the
court shall impose a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not
less than ten (10) years during which period of confinement the offender shall not
be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good
conduct, except for meritorious service .. Every person guilty of murder of the
second degree is punishable by imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and the
imprisonment may extend to life.
Wolff interpreted this statute to mean that if the jury were to find any statutory aggravating
circumstances in a non-capital case, the court would then be required to impose a fixed life
sentence.
After examining the statute, Harris agreed with Wolff's interpretation and believed Booth
would be subject to a fixed life sentence if the jury were to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a
statutory aggravating circumstance existed. Harris and Wolff subsequently met with the district
court judge prior to the scheduled pretrial conference to discuss the State's intent to request the
special verdict form. During this meeting, the parties discussed Wolff and Harris's mutual
understanding of LC. § 18-4004. The judge informed Wolff and Harris that the court would likely

4

LC. §§ 18-4004 and 19-2515 were amended in 2003 to reflect the requirement established by the United States
Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), that a jury, rather than a judge, find the necessary statutory
aggravating circumstances in a death penalty case. See 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 19, Res. 12510 Statement of
Purpose.
·
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use the special verdict form if it was requested by the State and supported by the evidence.
Thereafter, Harris prepared a memorandum to Booth outlining his understanding of the
potential penalties if Booth were to be convicted by a jury of first-degree murder. In the
memorandum, Harris set forth the text ofI.C. § 18-4004 and explained that,
Wbat this statute means is that upon a conviction for first degree murder, if the jury
or judge if [a] jury is waived, finds a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt[,] the sentence is death. However, if the prosecutor does not seek
death, as is the case here, and if a statutory aggravating circumstance is found, then
the sentence is a fixed life sentence. That means the person sentenced will spend his
life in prison and will die there. At the pre-trial conference on Friday the Judge
indicated to the prosecutor and myself that he will submit a verdict form to the jury
that will ask the question of the jury: "Did Trevor Booth commit the crime of first
degree murder? Yes or No." The verdict form will also contain the same question
for second degree murder and for manslaughter. If the jury finds you guilty of first
degree murder, the verdict form will contain the further question for the jury: "do
you find beyond a reasonable doubt a statutory aggravating circumstance? Yes or
No." Since the trial judge intends to submit the question to the jury as part of the
verdict form and if the jury finds a statutory aggravating circumstance as part of the
verdict, then the sentence to be imposed by the judge, notwithstanding all the
evidence there is in mitigation, [is] a fixed life sentence which means you will
spend the rest of your life in prison.
The memorandum goes on to explain what statutory aggravating circumstances the State intended
to prove. Harris mentioned that in his experience, "it is not too difficult for a finding to be made
that a murder is heinous (a murder by definition is considered heinous) atrocious or cruel or
alternatively that by committing the murder, the defendant showed utter disregard for life." Harris
also described, in detail, all of the State's evidence against Booth, and explained "based upon the
evidence as currently presented, I believe the high probability is that the jury is going to return a
verdict of guilty." Finally, Harris advised Booth that his best option was to consider entering into a
plea agreement with the State.
The bottom line is this. If you go to jury trial, there is the very strong probability of
facing a fixed life sentence. That means spending the rest of your life in prison. If
you enter a plea to murder with the prosecutor waiving aggravated circumstances,
or not requesting the court consider aggravated circumstances, then you would face
a minimum period of incarceration of ten years or whatever greater period the
judge[] might· impose. I have indicated above I do not think the Judge would
impose a term greater tha[n] fifteen years followed by an indeterminate life. Life in
that context means thirty years. My recommendation is because of the strong risk of
spendirig the rest of your life in prison, a plea agreement may be your best option.
After giving the memorandum to Booth, Harris met with Booth's family members to
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explain and discuss the memorandum. Harris discussed with Booth's family the nuances of the
statutory aggravating circumstances and the risks associated with taking the case to trial. During
this time, Harris continued to negotiate with Wolff regarding a potential plea agreement.
Booth subsequently entered into a Rule 11 plea agreement with the State. Pursuant to the
plea agreement, Booth agreed tO plead guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for the State's
agreement not to pursue statutory aggravating circumstances as part of sentencing. The Rule 11
agreement was filed with the court on June 9, 2005, and Booth entered a plea of guilty on the same
day. After holding a sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Booth to an indeterminate life
sentence with thirty years fixed.
\

After a failed appeal challenging his sentence, 5 Booth timely filed a petition for postconviction relief. The court dismissed all of Booth's allegations in support of his petition upon the
State's motion for summary dismissal, except for his allegations that (1) Harris used coercive and
threatening tactics to get him to plead guilty by assuring him and his family that he would receive a
ten year fixed sentence if he pleaded guilty and a fixed life sentence ifhe took the case to trial; and
(2) Harris used the sentencing memorandum to coerce him into pleading guilty and was not
adequately prepared to go to trial even though Booth felt he "had nothing to loose [sic] by going to
trial."
After an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the district court concluded that Harris'
representation of Booth fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because· Harris
erroneously advised Booth that he would be subject to a mandatory fixed life sentence if he went to
trial and the State's special verdict fonn was presented to the jury. According to the district court,
LC. § 18-4004 clearly indicates that if Booth's case had gone to trial, and the jury had found an
aggravating circumstance, such a finding would "merely have been advisory in nature and the
court would not have been mandated to sentence Booth to a fixed life term, but would actually
have been bound only to sentence within the parameters of a life sentence, with any fixed portion
above ten years .... "The court also determined that there was a reasonable probability that but for
Harris' erroneous interpretation of the statute, Booth would not have pleaded guilty and would
have proceeded to trial. Therefore, the district court granted Booth's petition for post-conviction
relief and ordered his guilty plea to be withdrawn and the case set for jury trial. The State timely
5

Booth appealed his sentence to the Court of Appeals, where his sentence was affirmed.

5

054

appealed to this Court.
II.

Issue on Appeal
I.

Whether the district court erred in granting Booth's petition for post-conviction relief
on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

III.
Discussion
A.

Standard of Review

When reviewing a district court's decision to grant or deny a petition for post-conviction
relief following an evidentiary hearing, this Court will not disturb the district court's factual
. findings unless they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); State v. Murray, 121Idaho918, 921, 828
P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed
question of law and fact. Murray, 121 Idaho at 921, 828 P.2d at 1326; Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984). When faced with a mixed question of fact and law, the. Court will defer
to the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, but will exercise free
review over the application of the relevant law to those facts. Murray, 121 Idaho at 921-22, 828
P.2d at 1326-27.

B.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

"The right to counsel in criminal actions brought by the state of Idaho is guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho
State Constitution." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010). A claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure
act. Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 862, 243 P.3d 675, 678 (Ct. App. 2010). To prevail on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance.
was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. McKeeth v. State, 140
Idaho 847, 850, 103 P.3d 460, 463 (2004); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This Court applies the
Stricklmyd test when determining whether a defendant has received ineffective assistance of

counsel during the plea process. McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 850, 103 P.3d at 463. Before deciding
whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to "the effective assistance of competent counsel."
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480-81 (2010). In this case, we conclude that the district

court did not err in determining that Harris' representation of Booth during the plea process was
deficient and that Booth was prejudiced as a result of such deficiency.
6 '
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1. Deficient Performance

On appeal, the State argues that Booth has not met his burden of demonstrating Harris'
performance was deficient because, even though the court ultimately concluded that Harris'
interpretation of LC .. § 18-4004 was incorrect, his interpretation was nevertheless objectively
reasonable under the circumstances. According to the State, the reasonableness of Harris'
interpretation is supported by the fact that the prosecutor also believed that the statute would
require the court to impose a fixed life sentence in the event that the jury found a statutory
aggravating circumstance. The State further argues that the district court also appeared to agree
with Harris' interpretation, given that it intended to provide the jury with a special verdict form
instructing them to consider whether a statutory aggravating circumstance had been proven.
Lastly, the State contends that Harris' memorandum demonstrates that Harris had carefully
reviewed the facts of the case, the .evidence that would likely be admitted at trial, and the
applicable law, before advising Booth that his best option was to enter a plea of guilty and,
therefore, Harris' representation of Booth was not deficient.
In order to demonstrate the attorney's performance was deficient, the defendant has the

burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Strickland,
466 U.S. at 688. In doing so, the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel
was competent and diligent in his or her representation of the defendant. Schoger v. State, 148
Idaho 622, 624, 226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010). Furthermore, "tactical or strategic decisions of trial
c~rnnsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate

preparation, ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation."
Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 234, 880 P.2d 261, 264 (Ct .App. 1994). "Where a defendant is

represented by counsel during the plea process and enters a plea upon the advice of counsel, the
voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60, 106
P.3d 376, 386 (2004) .. Specifically a guilty plea is only valid where the plea represents a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.

Id
Although it appears that this Court has never dealt with .the precise issue of whether a
defense attorney's erroneous interpretation of a sentencing statute constitutes deficient
7
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performance, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that when a statute
unambiguously sets forth a particular penalty, an attorney has a duty to provide correct advice
regarding such penalty. For example,. in Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court held that an attorney
engaged in deficient performance by failing to advise the defendant that his plea of guilty to drug
distribution made him. subject to automatic deportation because the consequences of the
defendant's guilty plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute. 130 S. Ct. at
1483. The Court reasoned that,
In the instant case, the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct,
clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla's
conviction.... Padilla's counsel could have easily determined that his plea would
make him eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the statute,
which addresses not some broad classification of crimes but specifically
commands removal for all controlled substances convictions except for the most
trivial of marijuana possession offenses. Instead, Padilla's counsel provided him
false assurance that his conviction would not result in his removal from this
country. This is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of
Padilla's plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his
deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel's advice was incorrect.

Id (internal citations omitted). Although the Court recognized that an attorney engages m
deficient performance by rendering advice that is inconsistent with the clear provisions of a
statute, the Court was careful to recognize that the result would not be the same where the law is
not as clear.
There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the
deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain. The duty of
the private practitioner in such cases is more limited. When the law is not succinct
and straightforward ... , a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise
a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse
immigration consequences. But when the deportation consequence is tnily clear,
as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.

Id Therefore, an attorney engages in deficient performance by rendering advice regarding
potential penalties during the plea process that is inconsistent with the plain and unambiguous
provisions of a sentencing statute. See also 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 422 ("The mere inaccuracy
of a prediction regarding sentence will not give rise to a claim for ineffective assistance, but a
gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome, combined with erroneous advice on the possible
effects of going to trial, falls below the required level of competence.")
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In this case, the district court did not err in finding that Harris' performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness due to his erroneous advice regarding the potential penalty
Booth would face if convicted at trial. Harris' interpretation of I.C. § 18-4004 is contrary to the
plain and unambiguous language of the statute. I.C. § 18-4004 specifically provides that in firstdegree murder cases, "if the death penalty is not sought, the court shall impose a life sentence
with a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (10) years." The language of the
statute makes it clear that in cases where the State chooses not to seek the death penalty, the
court is required to impose an indeterminate life sentence with at least ten years fixed.
It appears that. Harris based his .interpretation on the first part. of I.C. § 18-4004, which
'

provides,
Subject to the provisions of sections 19-2515 and 19-2515A, Idaho Code, every
person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be punished by death or by
imprisonment .for life, provided that a sentence of death shall not be imposed
unless the prosecuting attorney filed written notice of intent to seek the death
penalty as required under the provisions of section 18-4004A, Idaho Code, and
provided further that whenever the death penalty is not imposed the court shall
impose a sentence. If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, finds a statutory
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt but finds that the imposition
of the death p,enalty would be unjust, the court shall impose a fixed life sentence.
I.C. § 18-4004. However, Harris' interpretation is contrary to the plain language of this portion
of the statute as well. First and foremost, LC. § 18-4004 specifically references I.C. §§ 19-2515
and 19-2515A, which are both statutes that are only applicable in capital cases. LC.§ 19-2515A
prohibits the court from imposing the death penalty against a "mentally retarded person." LC. §
19-2515A. Furthermore, LC. § 19-2515 Syts forth the procedures for holding a· special sentencing
proceeding in capital cases 6 and articulates the instructions to be given to the jury during these
proceedings. 7 Finally, LC. § 19-2515(9) goes on to lay out the various statutory aggravating

6

I.C. § 19-2515(5) provides,
If a person is adjudicated guilty of murder in the first degree, whether by acceptance of a plea of
guilty, by verdict of a jury, or by decision of the trial court sitting without a jury, and a notice of
intent to seek the death penalty was filed and served as provided in section 18-4004A, Id,aho Code,
a special sentencing proceeding shall be held promptly for the purpose of hearing all relevant
evidence and arguments of counsel in aggravation and mitigation of the offense.... The special
sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant
with the consent of the prosecuting attorney.
7
According to I.C. § 19-2515(7),
The jury shall be informed as follows:
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circumstances that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to justify the imposition
of the death penalty. LC. § 19-2515(9). The lead-in to subsection 9 states, "[t]he following are
statutory aggravating circumstances, at least one (1) of which must be found to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt before a sentence of death can be imposed." I.C. § 19-2515(9) (emphasis
added).
These statutory sections make clear that the provision in LC .. § 18-4004 requiring the
jury, or the court if a jury is waived, to impose a fixed life sentence for a first-degree murder
conviction in the event that a statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt applies only to those cases where the death penalty is sought. Under the
statutory scheme, the court is only required to impose a fixed life sentence when (1) the State has
filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty; (2) the State seeks the death penalty; (3) the
defendant is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, first-degree murder; (4) a special sentencing
proceeding is held during which the jury,. or the court if a jury is waived, determines that at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and (5) after
weighing any mitigating evidence against the statutory aggravating circumstances, the jury, or
the court if a jury is waived, finds that imposition of the death penalty is unjust. It is clear from
the relevant statutes that statutory aggravating circumstances can only be sought in a death
penalty case. Because the State did not seek the death penalty in Booth's case, if Booth went to
trial and was convicted of first-degree murder, he would have been subject to an indeterminate
life sentence with at least ten years fixed, but not a mandatory fixed life sentence, as Harris

(a) If the jury finds that a statutory aggravating circumstance exists and no mitigating
circumstances exist which would make the imposition of the death penalty unjust, the defendant
will be sentenced to death by the court.
(b) ·If the jury finds the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance but finds that the
existence of mitigating circumstances makes the imposition of the death penalty unjust or the jury
cannot· unanimously agree on ·whether the existence of mitigating circumstances makes the
imposition of the death penalty unjust, the defendant will be sentenced to a term of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole; and
(c) If the jury does not find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance or if the jury
cannot unanimously agree on the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, the defendant
will be sentenced by the court to a term of life imprisonment with a fixed term of not less than ten
(10) years.
·
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asserted. 8
Given that the information Harris provided when advising Booth to plead guilty to firstdegree murder was based on a blatantly erroneous reading of the sentencing statutes, the district
court did not err in determining that Harris' performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Just as in Padilla, the potential penalties in Idaho for first-degree murder in a
non-capital case are clear from the statute and, therefore, Harris' duty to give correct advice in
that regard is equally clear. It cannot be said that Booth's plea was entered voluntarily when
Harris' advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.

Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 60, 106 P.3d at 386.
Moreover, the State's argument that Harris' interpretation of LC. § 18-4004 was
reasonable because the district judge and the prosecutor appeared to share the same interpretation
is without merit. Just because other parties shared Harris' erroneous interpretation of the statute
does not mean Harris' interpretation was reasonable, given that such an interpretation is contrary
to the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. Therefore, we find that Booth met his
burden of demonstrating that Harris' performance was deficient.

2. Prejudice
The State argues that Booth has not met his burden of demonstrating he was prejudiced
by Harris' allegedly deficient performance because, even if Booth had insisted on going to trial,
he would have still been subject to the same penalty as when he pleaded guilty. The State
contends that even if Booth went to trial in hopes of obtaining a conviction for second-degree
murder rather than first-degree murder, there no is reason to conclude that his sentence would
have been any different and, therefore, rejecting the plea agreement and proceeding to trial
would not have been rational under the circumstances. Rather, the State asserts that Booth's best
option was to plead guilty and request leniency from the court regarding the sentence.
In order to demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show "a reasonable probability that
the outcome of trial would be different but for counsel's deficient performance." McKay, 148
Idaho at 570, 225 P.3d at 703. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Id (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). When a defendant alleges
8

On appeal, the State does not argue that Harris' interpretation of the statutes was correct. The State offered such an
argument before the district court in support of its Motion to Reconsider. However, the same argument has not been
advanced on appeal.
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some deficiency in counsel's advice regarding a guilty plea, the defendant must demonstrate that
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial." Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925,
930 (2010) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

In this case, the district court did not err in determining that, but for Harris' erroneous
advice regarding the possibility of a fixed life sentence, Booth would have elected to proceed to
trial. It is clear from Harris' memorandum that he advised Booth to plead guilty because he
believed that there was a strong likelihood Booth would be convicted of first-degree murder and
would be subject to a fixed life sentence in the event that the jury also found a statutory
aggravating circumstance.
The bottom line is this. If you go to jury trial, there is the very strong probability
of facing a fixed life sentence. That means spending the rest of your life in prison.
If you enter a plea to murder with the prosecutor waiving aggravated
circumstances, or not requesting .the court consider aggravated circumstances,
then you would face a minimum period of incarceration of ten years or whatever
greater period the judge[] might impose .... My recommendation is because of
the strong risk of spending the rest ofyour life in prison, a plea agreement may be
· your best option.
Moreover, the Rule 11 plea agreement was based entirely on Harris and Wolffs
erroneous interpretation of the statute. Booth pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in exchange
for the State's agreement not to seek "an aggravated circumstance as that tenn is referenced in
Idaho Code 18-4004." The Rule 11 agreement also required the court to refrain from making a
"finding of an aggravated circumstance as that term is used in Idaho Code 18-4004 for the
purposes of sentencing." Harris was unable to reach an agreement with the State on what the
recommended sentence would be at sentencing and, therefore, the plea agreement provided that
"the sentence to be imposed is reserved to the sourid discretion of the Court." Thus, the sole
benefit that Booth received under the plea agreement was the State's agreement not to seek
aggravating circumstances-something Booth was never subject to in the first place.
Lastly, Booth filed an affidavit in support of his petition for post-conviction relief,
wherein he stated that,
I pled guilty to First Degree Murder only after my attorney Richard Harris
threatened me with a Fixed Life Sentence if I insisted op going to trial. Mr. Harris
told me that the judge had told him that he would give the jury a special verdict
form asking for an aggravating fact and Mr. Harris told me as well as my family
12
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that the jury would find an aggravating factor and that the Court would then be
bound to sentence me to a fixed life sentence.
I wanted to go to trial and to prove that I did not intentionally shoot the victim. I
never wanted to plead guilty to the charge. I only plead [sic] guilty because Mr.
Harris told me I would get a Fixed Life Sentence and that the Judge would be
bound to give it to me and if I plead [sic] guilty I would only get 10 years.
When asked at the evidentiary hearing what had convinced him to plead guilty, Booth responded,
"[t]he fact that my attorney, the person who represented me, Richard Harris, repeatedly told me
that ifl did take this to trial, there is a huge chance that I would do life in prison .... I would die in
prison." Based on this evidence, the district court did not err in determining that but for Harris'
error, Booth wouJd not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
The State's arguments on appeal fail for several reasons. First, the State misstates the law
when arguing that "even if Boot)1 would have insisted on going to trial in the hopes of obtaining
a conviction on second-degree murder rather than first-degree murder, Booth would have faced
the same potential penalty he believed he was subject to· when he pied guilty to first-degree
murder, i.e., up to life with a minimum of ten years fixed." Contrary to the State's assertion, the
potential penalty for first-degree murder differs significantly from the potential penalty for
second-degree murder. Under LC .. § 18-4004, second-degree murder is "punishable by
imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and the imprisonment may extend to life." I.C. § 184004. In contrast, following a conviction for first-degree murder, in cases where the death
penalty is not sought, the court is required to impose an indeterminate life sentence with a
minimum period of confinement of not less than ten years. LC. § 18-4004. In other words, a
defendant convicted of first-degree murder automatically receives an indeterminate life sentence
with a fixed term of ten years, while a defendant convicted of second-degree murder only faces a
fixed term of ten years, with an undefined indeterminate term. Therefore, the State erroneously
argues that Booth would have faced the same potential penalty if he were convicted of seconddegree murder after trial.
More importantly, the State's arguments demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of
the law as itrelates'to the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. The State's.arguments focus on
the fact that Booth has not demonstrated that the outcome of his case, specifically, his sentence,
would have been any different if he went to trial. However, in this context, the relevant inquiry is
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whether, but for Harris' errors, Booth would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial. Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676, 227 P.3d at 930. As this Court has previously noted, the
focus is "on the defendant's state of mind when choosing to plead guilty," and there is no
requirement that the Court speculate as to the potential sentence for a lesser charged offense
should the jury convict on that basis at retrial. McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 853, 103 P.3d at 466. Thus,
the State's arguments fail because they do not address Booth's state of mind when pleading
guilty or how his state of mind was affected by Harris' erroneous advice. 9 As mentioned above,
the evidence demonstrates that Booth would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial if were not for Harris' advice regarding the potential of a fixed life sentence.
IV.
Conclusion
The d,istrict court did not err in concluding that Booth met his burden of demonstrating
Harris' performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. Therefore, we affirm the
district court's decision to grant Booth's petition for post-conviction relief.

Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.

9

The State also appears to argue that Booth was not prejudiced because his best option was to plead guilty .and
request leniency from the court based on the victim's mutual involvement in the drug community, his own drug
addiction at the time of the murder, and his assertion that he acted out of fear for the safety of himself and his
family. Although the State may be correct that Booth likely benefited by taking responsibility and pleading guilty to
the crime, such a factor is not relevant in determining whether Booth has met his burden of demonstrating prejudice.
As the United States Supreme Court has noted,
The nature of relief secured by a successful collateral challenge to a guilty plea-an opportunity to
withdraw the plea and proceed to trial-imposes its own significant limiting principle. Those who
collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea.
Thus, a different calculus informs whether it is wise to challenge a guilty plea in a habeas
proceeding because ultimately, the challenge may result in a less favorable outcome for the
defendant, whereas a collateral challenge to conviction obtained after a jury trial has no similar
potential downside.
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485-86 (emphasis in original). Therefore, the fact that Booth may have benefited by pleading
guilty instead of going to trial is not relevant to whether he was prejudiced by Harris' deficient performance.
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D. RAY BARKER
Attorney at Law
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 1380
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.

DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW the Defendant, Dale

Case No. CR-00-00260 ·
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE

C. Shackelford, by and through his attorney

for record, D. Ray Barker, and sets forth the facts and the arguments in support of
Defendant's Motion for Disqualification for Cause.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Judge Stegner presided over the trial of the Defendant in the year 2000

and the sentencing in 2001. Judge Stegner also presided over the criminal proceedings
of the Defendant's Co-Defendants, Mary Abitz, CR-00-00262; Sonja Abitz, CROO-

Brief in Support of Defendant's
Motion for Disqualification for Cause - 1
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00263; Bernadette Lasater, CR 00-00264; and Martha Millar, CR 00-02022. Judge
Stegner ordered presentence investigations, hereinafter PSl's on each of the abovenamed Co-Defendants and sentenced each of the above-named Co-Defendants.
2.

From 2001 through 2006, Judge Stegner presided over Defendant's Post-

Conviction Relief, hereinafter PCR proceedings in Latah County Case No. CV 01004272.
3.

At the sentencing hearing of Sonja Abitz on September 5, 2001, Judge

Stegner made the following statement:
COURT:
Well, let's get to the point. This statement,
which I saw during the trial or shortly before the trial, is some
of the most incriminating testimony against Dale
Shackelford. As I was saying, this statement is some of the
most incriminating testimony I saw at the time of trial or prior
to trial. I still think it's some of the most incriminating
testimony against Dale Shackelford. It didn't come out at
trial. And now I think the effort is to try to distance Ms. Abitz
from this statement. (TR. P.42, Ln 3-11)
4.

In the above-quoted statement, Judge StegnE?r was referring to a

statement made by Sonja Abitz on February 12, 2000, without the benefit of counsel,
while in custody at the Latah County Jail, during an interrogation by a law enforcement
officer.
5.

In the above-quoted statement, Judge Stegner stated that he saw the

statement during or shortly before the trial and stated that it didn't come out at trial.
6.

The trial Judge Stegner was referring to was the trial of the Defendant

which occurred between October 16, 2000 and December 22, 2000.

Brief in Support of Defendant's
Motion for Disqualification for Cause - 2
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7.

In the previous proceedings in this matter and in the proceedings of the

above-named Co-Defendants, Judge Stegner has expressed his opinions that the
Defendant manipulated, deceived, coerced and utilized other improper, illegal and
immoral schemes to influence others including Co-Defendants to perform acts they
would not otherwise perform.
ARGUMENT

A motion to disqualify a judge for cause may be made at any time, Idaho Criminal
Rule 25(c), and may be used to disqualify a judge who is biased or prejudiced for or
against any party or that party's case in an action; Idaho Criminal Rule 25(b)(4). It is
well settled in Idaho that due process requires an impartial judge. State v. SandovalTena, 138 Idaho 908, 71 P.3d 1055 (2003). Judges in Idaho also have the option of

voluntarily disqualifying himself or herself. Idaho Criminal Rule 25(d).
In this case, Judge Stegner apparently reviewed the statement of Sonja Abitz ·
before or during the trial of the Defendant. The hearing in which the judge made the
above-quoted statement was on September 5, 2001. The sentencing hearing in this
case commenced on August 27, 2001, and the Judge announced the sentence on
October 25, 2001. The above-quoted statement is inadmissible testimonial hearsay and
cannot be used against the Defendant. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.
Ct. 1354, 158 LEd. 2d 177 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court ovE:muled Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 2.Ed. 2d 597 (1980) and held that out-of-court
statements that qualify as testimonial are not admissible under the Confrontation Clause
Brief in Support of Defendant's
Motion for Disqualification for Cause - 3
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unless the witness is unavailable and Defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness.

Such statements include at a minimum, prior testimony at a

preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial, and statements elicited
during police interrogations.

Prior to Crawford, under the Roberts test, the right to

confrontation did not bar admission of an unavailable witness statement against a
criminal defendant if the statement bore "adequate indicia of reliability", a test met when
the evidence either falls within a firmly routed hearsay exception or bore "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness. Roberts at 488 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531. The court
discredited the reliability standard and stated that the Roberts b;;st allows a jury to hear
evidence untested by the adversary process, based on a mere judicial determination of
reliability Crawford at 1"370, 124 S. Ct.
In this case, Judge Stegner has reviewed voluminous materials that are
testimonial hearsay which have not been subjected to cross examination. One example
is the above-quoted statement of Sonja Abitz. He has read numerous statements taken
by law enforcement officers which are clearly testimonial hearsay.
What is testimonial hearsay and, subject to the right of confrontation, and what is
not was addressed in Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 547 U.S. 813, 165 L.Ed.2d
224 (2006) which provides that statements taken by police officers in the course of an ·
interrogation

a~e

"nontestimonial" and not subject to the Confrontation Clause, when

they are made under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency and
Brief in Support of Defendant's
Motion for Disqualification for Cause - 4

067

statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogation are "testimonial" and
subject to the Confrontation Clause when the circumstances objectively indicate that
there is not ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose is to establish or prove
past events potentially relevant to the later criminal prosecution. The case held that
responses to a 911 operator during an incident in which the victim identified her
assailant while he was inside her home were not testimonial,.but that written statements
in an affidavit given to police officers who responded to the domestic disturbance were
testimonial and subject to the Confrontation Clause.
Virtually, all of the reports generated by law enforcement in this case are
testimonial and therefore inadmissible testimonial hearsay. It would appear that Judge
Stegner has read most, if not all, such reports generated in the case of the Defendant
and the cases of all of his co-defendants.
In the Post Conviction Relief proceedings, the State requested that all of the
notes of the defense counsel be turned over to the State for purposes of the State's
response to the Petition for Post Conviction Relief.

The extraordinary result of that

request was that the defense counsel was directed to turn over their notes from their
files made during the preparation of the case and during the trial to the trial judge to
review so that the judge could determine what would and would not be turned over to
the State.

Therefore, Judge Stegner has in this case, reviewed all of the notes of

defense counsel. The State was given the notes due to the waiver of the attorney-client
privilege based on the claims made in the petition for Post Conviction Relief. But that
Brief in Support of Defendant's
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attorney-client privilege should not be considered a basis for the court to review such
notes and still remain in the case for subsequent purposes.
Judge Stegner has also been exposed to all of the victim impact statements
contained in the original Presentence Investigation Report and to those given orally at
.the sentencing hearings. Many of those statements contained inflammatory statements
about the Defendant, his character, and the crime. Numerous witnesses testified at the
sentencing hearing and gave their opinions about the Defendant, his character, and the
crime. Several of the witnesses expressed their wishes that all manner of punishments
be imposed on the Defendant. None of such statements or testimony should have been
admitted and Judge Stegner should not have been exposed to either the statements nor
the testimony.

In addition, persons who were not immediate family members gave

victim impact statements. In State v. Payne, Idaho 548, 199 P.3d 123 (2008), the Idaho
Supreme Court considered victim impact statements which described Payne as evil, a
waste aspirin, a sociopath, a cold blooded killer, unremorseful, a predator, cold and
calculating, not a man, a pathetic monster, a wimp and a man without a conscience.
Witnesses also expressed their wishes that Payne "rot in hell, burn in hell or be
tortured." The court held that these statements were characterizations and opinions
about Payne, the crime, his appropriate punishment, and calls to religious authority as
the basis for punishment and were all inadmissible.

The statements and testimony

described in Payne, is not unlike that which was presented in the Defendant's initial
sentencing hearing and Judge Stegner was exposed to all of it.
Brief in Support of Defendant's
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In Payne, the court also held that l.C.§19-5306, limits victim impact' statements to
immediate family members. Judge Stegner also heard victim impact statements from
non-immediate family members.
In Payne, the court considered at length, the issue of whether the admission of
the inadmissible victim impact statements could be considered harmless error.

The

court acknowledged that judges are able to sort out truly relevant, admissible evidence
presented in the form of victim ·impact statements. The court stated that considering the
nature and the high volume of victim impact statements and statements by the District
Court, there was reasonable doubt as to whether the inadmissible evidence contributed
to Payne's sentence and based on that reasonable doubt, the court vacated Payne's
sentence and remanded for resentencing.
It is quite possible that a reviewing court in this case would conclude that the
inadmissible evidence and information in the form in testimonial hearsay and victim
impact statements combined with the knowledge Judge Stegner has obtained from
reviewing the notes of defense counsel and dealing with all of the related cases taken
together lead to the conclusion that there is a reasonable doubt as to whether all these
things contributed to the sentence imposed in this resentencing.
The bell has been rung many times in this case, more time than it can be unrung
even with the best of intentions and integrity.

Brief in Support of Defendant's
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DATED this _g,.,, /day of August, 2011.

£2 ,.//

;/~l
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

:> y/f

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of August, 2011, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid,
and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of
the office of or serving by facsimile:
William W. Thompson
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843
[]
~;(]

[]

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile
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D. RAY BARKER
Attorney at Law
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 1380

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

)
)

v.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.

)
)
)

Case No. CR-00-00260
DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
FOR CAUSE

)

STATE OF IDAHO )
) :ss
)
County of Latah
DALE C. SHACKELFORD, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says
as follows:
1.

Judge Stegner presided over the trial of the Defendant in the year 2000

and the sentencing in 2001. Judge Stegner also presided over the criminal proceedings
of the Defendant's Co-Defendants, Mary Abitz, CR-00-00262; Sonja Abitz, CR0000263; Bernadette Lasater, CR 00-00264; and Martha Millar, CR 00-02022. Judge
Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Defendant's
Motion for Disqualification for Cause - 1
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Stegner ordered presentence investigations, hereinafter PS l's on each of the abovenamed Co-Defendants and sentenced each of the above-named Co-Defendants.
2.

From 2001 through 2006, Judge Stegner presided over Defendant's Post-

Conviction Relief, hereinafter PCR proceedings in Latah County Case No. CV 01004272.
3.

At the sentencing hearing of Sonja Abitz on September 5, 2001, Judge

Stegner made the following statement:
COURT:
Well, let's get to the point. This statement,
which I saw during the trial or shortly before the trial, is some
of the most incriminating testimony against Dale
Shackelford. As I was saying, this statement is some of the
most incriminating testimony I saw at the time of trial or prior
to trial. I still think it's some of the most incriminating
testimony against Dale Shackelford. It didn't come out at
trial. And now I think the effort is to try to distance Ms. Abitz
from this statement. (TR. P.42, Ln 3-11)
4.

In the above-quoted statement, Judge Stegner was referring to a

statement made by Sonja Abitz on February 12, 2000, without the benefit of counsel,
while in custody at the Latah County Jail, during an interrogation by a law enforcement
officer.
5.

In the above-quoted statement, Judge Stegner stated that he saw the

statement during or shortly before the trial and stated that it didn't come out at trial.
6.

The trial Judge Stegner was referring to was the trial of the Defendant

which occurred between October 16, 2000 and December 22, 2000.
Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Defendant's
Motion for Disqualification for Cause - 2
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7.

In the previous proceedings in this matter and in the proceedings of the

above-named Co-Defendants, Judge Stegner has expressed his opinions that the
Defendant manipulated, deceived, coerced and utilized other improper, illegal and
immoral schemes to influence others including Co-Defendants to perform acts they
would not otherwise perform.
DATED

thisd~~day

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

2011.

Q.C/\ day ofe\J (f/I

I,

I
'

Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Defendant's
Motion for Disqualification for Cause - 3

074

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ay of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed
to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person ilJ charge of the office of or
serving by facsimile:
William W. Thompson
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843
[] ·

N
[]

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Defendant's
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D. RAY BARKER
Attorney at Law
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 1380
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-00-00260
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE

Defendant.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)

COMES NOW the Defendant, Dale C. Shackelford, by and through his attorney
for record, D. Ray Barker, and pursuant to Rule 25(b)(4) moves to disqualify the
Honorable Judge John R. Stegner for cause. Such a disqualification would have the
effect of preventing Judge Stegner from presiding in the scheduled resentencing of the

Defendant's Motion for Disqualification
for Cause -1

.•

076

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of August, 2011, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid,
and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of
the office of or serving by facsimile:
William W. Thompson
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843

[1

fl

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

o. Ray B?'ker
Attorney at Law

Defendant's Motion for Disqualification
for Cause - 2
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D. RAY BARKER
Attorney at Law
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 1380
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-00-00260
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
OF SENTENCING HEARING

Defendant.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)

COMES NOW the Defendant, Dale C. Shackelford, by and through his attorney
for record, D. Ray Barker, and moves the Court for a continuance of the sentencing
hearing scheduled for August 26, 2011, at 9:00 a.m. in Orofino, Idaho.
The basis for the motion is that the Defendant's counsel has insufficient time to
prepare for the hearing and to meet with and review materials with the Defendant.
Defense counsel has been reviewing materials including a transcript of the original
sentencing hearing. Defense counsel intends to review the original PSI as well as the
updated PSI which was received on August 8, 2011. Said counsel was advised that the
Motion for Continuance - 1
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Defendant would be moved during the first week of August. On Friday, August 5, 2011,
counsel contacted the Idaho State Prison and was advised that instead of being
transported the first week of August, that the Defendant would be transported in the
next ten to twelve days. Counsel had intended to meet with the Defendant at Orofino
during the first week of August if he had been transferred that week and also intended
to meet with him during this second week of August.

Now, it appears that the

Defendant will not be in Orofino until some time in the third week of August. Counsel
cannot prepare for a sentencing hearing on August 26, 2011, and adequately represent
his client.
There is also pending before the court a Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause. It
was the intent of counsel to set that motion for hearing after the Defendant was
transported to Orofino so that the Defendant could be present for that hearing.
A continuance of approximately three weeks is requested.
DATED this

9/4

day of August, 2011.

/),

&4~-

D. Ray , arker
Attorney for Defendant

Motion for Continuance - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
day of August, 2011, a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid,
and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of
the office of or serving by facsimile:
William W. Thompson
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843
[]
[x]
[]

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

D. Ray Bqrker
Attorney at Law
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D. RAY BARKER
Attorney at Law
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 1380
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)

Case No. CR-00-00260

)

STIPULATION RE: RESPONSE TO
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION
REPORT

)

)

v.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)

)

IT IS HEREBY stipulated between the State and the Defendant, Dale C.
Shackelford, that the defense be allowed additional time in which to file its objection and
responses to the Presentence Investigation Report as updated, and to produce a
witness list. It is stipulated that such objection and responses shall be filed on or before
August 23, 2011.

Stipulation Re: Response to
-1
Presentence Investigation Report
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DATED this 11th day of August, 2011.

D. Ray Barker
Attorne/for Defendant

William W. Thomps
Latah County Prosecutin

Stipulation Re: Response to
-2
Presentence Investigation Report
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D. RAY BARKER
Attorney at Law
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 1380

CLER!\ OF
LP.TJ\H

BY __ , )&~ DEPUTY

Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

)

v.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.

Case No. CR-00-00260
NOTICE OF HEARING ON
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
FOR CAUSE

)
)
)
)
)

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will call on for hearing the Defendant's
Motion for Disqualification for Cause at the courtroom of the above-entitled court at the Latah
County Courthouse, 522 S. Adams, Moscow, Idaho, on the 23rd day of August, 2011, at the hour
of 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.
DATED this 11th day of August, 2011.

D.RayB ker
Attorne, for Defendant

NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
FORCAUSE-1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1lth day of August, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing documents was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to, or by
personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of the office of or serving by
facsimile:
William W. Thompson
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843
[ ]

N

[ ]

By:

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile (208) 883-2290

D.Rayar7r

NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
FORCAUSE-2
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D. RAY BARKER
Attorney at Law
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 1380
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-00-00260
NOTICE OF HEARING ON
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF
SENTENCING HEARING

Defendant.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will call on for hearing the Defendant's
Motion for Continuance of Sentencing Hearing at the courtroom of the above-entitled court at
the Latah County Courthouse, 522 S. Adams, Moscow, Idaho, on the 23rd day of August, 2011,
at the hour of9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.
DATED this 11th day of August, 2011.

NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR
CONTINUANCE OF SENTENCING HEARING - 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day of August, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing documents was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to, or by
personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of the office of or serving by
facsimile:
William W. Thompson
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843

[ ]

JX1
[

By:

]

First-class mail·
Hand-delivered
Facsimile (208) 883-2290

D~tt~

D.RaYarker

NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR
CONTINUANCE OF SENTENCING HEARING - 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,

vs.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,

Defendant.

Case No. CR-2000-260

)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER FOR TRANSPORT

)
)
)

It is ORDERED that the above named defendant be transported· from the
Idaho Correctional Institution in Orofino, Idaho, to the Clearwater · County
Courthouse for hearing of his Motion to Disqualify at 10:00 A.l\tf. on August 26, 2011.

rJ..

.

DATED this

tJ day of August 2011.

91/V'-

~~-

John R. Stegner
District Judge

ORDER FOR TRANSPORT - l
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE'
I do hereby certify that a full, true
complete and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER FOR TRANSPORT was transmitted
by facsimile to:

D. RAY BARKER
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
882-7604

CLEARWATER COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
208-476-7835

and hand delivered to:
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR.
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY ·
and sent by PFD email to:
IDAHO CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
OROFINO, IDAHO
icio@idoc.idaho.gov
BRETT PHILLIPS
IDAHO STATE BOARD OF CORRECTION
bp hillip@idoc.id. gov

ORDER FOR TRANSPORT - 2

088

CLERK QF

D. RAY BARKER
Attorney at Law
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 1380

rnr_ , _. .·
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DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-00-00260
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION AND
RESPONSES TO PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION AND WITNESS
LIST

)
)

COMES NOW the Defendant, Dale C. Shackelford, by and through his attorney
for record, D. Ray Barker, and objects to and responds to the Presentence Report dated
March 6, 2001, and the Update to the Presentence Investigation dated August 4, 2011.

OBJECTIONS

I.

The Defendant objects to the consideration of the three DOR's described

on page one of the Update to Presentence Investigation on the basis that he did nothing
wrong in each incident as he will explain at the sentencing hearing. The Defendant also
objects to the C-Notes as cumulative in that the DOR'S are mentioned repeatedly and
include material taken out of context.

Defendant's Objections and Responses to Presentence
Investigation and Witness List - 1
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II.

The Defendant objects to the letter from R. Scott Killen, the Assistant

Prosecuting Attorney from Madison Gounty, Missouri on the basis of the holding in
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed. 2d 177 (2004). That

holding was that out-of-court statements by witnesses that are testimonial are barred,
under the Confrontation Clause, unless the witnesses are unavailable and Defendants
had prior opportunity to cross-'examine witnesses.
Ill.

The Defendant objects to the letter from Suzanne Birrell, NEE, Ninichuck

on the basis of the holding in State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 199, P.3d 123 (2008)
which limited victim impact statements to members of the deceased's immediate family.
Suzanne Birrell, NEE, Ninichuck is not a member of the immediate family.
IV.

The Defendant objects to the letters from Bernadette Lasater, addressed

to Judge John Stegner, on the basis of the holding in Crawford v. Washington, as stated
above. Although Bernadette Lasater was subject to cross-examination by the defense
at trial, she was not subject to cross examination as to the statements contained in
those letters, authored a decade or more after the trial.
V.

The Defendant objects to the letter from Martha J. Millar on the basis of

the holding in Crawford v. Washington, as stated above. Although Martha J. Millar was
subject to cross-examination by the defense at trial, she was not subject to crossexamination as to the statements contained in those letters.
VI.

The Defendant objects to the form entitled "Idaho Maximum Security

Institution Acknowledgment of Monitoring of Phone Calls" on which is hand-written
"Inmate refused to Sign."

The basis of the objection is relevance. Mr. Shackelford

simply did not choose to consent to the monitoring of his telephone calls. This is an

Defendant's Objections and Responses to Presentence
Investigation and Witness List - 2
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attempt to put a negative spin on an inmate simply expressing his displeasure with a
policy. He had no obligation to sign the document.
VII.

The Defendant objects to the "Official Version" at page 2 of the original

Presentence Report to the extent that it is a recitation of the conclusions of the
prosecutor. This objection is based on the holding in United States v. Rome, 207 F.3d
251 (5th Cir, 2000) which states at, 254, as follows:
[4] A PSR generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability to be
considered as evidence by a sentencing judge when making
factual determinations. United States v. Narviz-Guerra, 148
F.3d 530, 537 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1046, 119 S.
Ct. 601, 142 L.Ed.2d 543 (1998). An exception is made,
however, when the PSR simply gives "a recitation of the
conclusions of ... the prosecutor." United States v. Elwood,
999 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1993).
This objection is made specifically to the first full paragraph of page three of the
original Presentence Report which begins with the words, "Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Robin Eckman, reported ... "
VIII.

The Defendant objects to the victim impact statements contained in the

original Presentence Report, at pages five and six, specifically, the statements of Mike
Palahniuk in which he states that Mr. Shackelford's life should be taken; Chuck
Palahniuk in which he states that he would like the State to execute Mr. Shackelford
and that he requests to witness the execution while also quoting religious authority
regarding punishment.

This objection is based on Idaho Criminal Rule 32(c) which

prohibits specific recommendations regarding sentencing and on State v. Payne, 146
Idaho 548, 193 P.3d 123 (2008) which prohibits victim impact statements which are
characterization and opinions about the Defendant, the crime, the appropriate
punishment and calls to religious authority as a basis for punishment.
Defendant's Objections and Responses to Presentence
Investigation and Witness List - 3
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IX.

The Defendant objects to the inclusion under the Prior Records Section at

page 7 of the original Presentence Report of the reference to a Forcible Rape With
Weapon or Injury; Forcible Sodomy; Felonious Restraint dated 08/26/1998. The basis
of the objection is that those charges were dismissed and should not be included.
X.

The Defendant objects to the statement on page eight of the original

Presentence Report, third paragraph that he had reported to a prison official that he had
also been charged with felonious use of a weapon and rape in connection with the
sodomy case. He was not charged with felonious use of a weapon and never told a
prison official that he was so charged. He was charged with Rape, but was found not
guilty of that offense. Offenses for which a defendant is found to be not guilty ought not
to appear in a Presentence Report.
value.

The prejudicial effect outweighs any probative

This objection is based on the same reasoning as Rule 403 Idaho Rules of

Evidence.
XI.

The Defendant objects to the fifth paragraph on page eight of the original

Presentence Report which makes reference to his having been charged with
possession of dangerous contraband and attempting to escape and having been
acquitted of those charges. Again, the prejudicial effect of such information outweighs
any probative value as stated in said Rule 403.
XII. The Defendant further objects to the entry contained in the Offender History
attached to the Update to the Presentence Investigation appearing on the page
designated on the bottom as 00025 and dated May 15, 2006, which includes a verbal
threat to kill one of the guards and states that the Defendant would get a DOR. That

Defendant's Objections and Responses to Presentence
Investigation and Witness List - 4

092

event did not happen and Mr. Shackelford did not receive a DOR for threatening staff as
stated in that entry.
RESPONSES

I.

The original Presentence Report contains several errors or misleading

statements. On page 13, there is a statement that Mr. Shackelford tested positive for
Tuberculosis, and he participated in preventative medication therapy. That statement
implies that the Defendant had or has Tuberculosis.

Actually, Mr. Shackelford was

exposed to Tuberculosis and immediately thereafter participated in preventative
medication therapy so that he would not get the disease. As a result of that medication
therapy, he tested positive for Tuberculosis.
II.

Also on page 13, the original Presentence Report states that the Latah

County Jail reported that Mr. Shackelford had not had any medical complaints or visits
with the nurse, and he is not taking any medications at this time.

In fact, Mr.

Shackelford took high blood pressure medication daily during his time at the Latah
County Jail and continues to take such medication on a daily basis.
Ill.

Under Collateral Contacts, there appear to be several contacts from whom

there is nothing in the report as to what may have been received from that contact.
Was there mitigating or positive information from those persons which was not
included? One of those contacts, John Smith from Missouri Probation and parole could
have reported that in 2000, Mr. Shackelford successfully completed his term of parole
and was released from parole.
The report does not include any information regarding an event in which Mr.
Shackelford came upon a motor vehicle accident and saved several people's lives.

Defendant's Objections and Responses to Presentence
Investigation and Witness List - 5
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WITNESS LIST
The Defendant intends to call as witnesses the following:
Jackye Squire Leonard - Presentence Investigator
Officer Jared Miller from l.M.S.I.
Dale C. Shackelford

DATED this

.~'3,.)day of August, 2011.

~µ

Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

yo{

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the j? '3
day of August, 2011, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid,
and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of
the office of or serving by facsimile:
William W. Thompson
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843

[]

N

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

Defendant's Objections and Responses to Presentence
Investigation and Witness List - 6
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
SECOND
INAND
THE
OF
COURT MINUTES John R. Stegner
District Judge

Sheryl L. Engler
Court Reporter
Recording: CD484-1
Time: 10:42 A.M.

Date: August 26, 2011
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, )
Defendant.

)
)
)

Case No. CR2000-260
APPEARANCES:
William W. Thompson, Jr., Prosecutor
Appearing on behalf of the State
Defendant present with counsel,
D. Ray Barker, Moscow, Idaho

=================================================================
Subject of Proceedings: MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for conducting a motion
hearing in this matter. Court noted the presence of counsel and the defendant, Dale
Carter Shackelford.
Court vacates the sentencing and will conduct a hearing on the Motion for
Disqualification for Cause, at this time.
Mr. Barker asks that the defendant's handcuffs be removed to allow him to make
notes. Court allows the removal of the defendant's handcuffs.
Mr. Barker makes argument regarding the Motion to Disqualify.
Mr. Thompson advises the Court that the State will rely on the briefing that has
been previously given to the Court. Mr. Thompson further advises that this case has
been sent back for re-sentencing on two of the counts. Mr. Thompson asks the Court to
deny the Motion to Disqualify and set a date for re-sentencing.
Mr. Barker advises the Court that the Motion For Disqualification for Cause is an

Deputy Clerk - Christy L. Gering
COURT MINUTES - 1 of 2
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CASE NO. CR2000-260
STATE OF IDAHO V. DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD

ex parte proceeding and does not think the State has standing to make this objection.
Mr. Thompson responds.
Court denies the Motion to Disqualify for Cause.
Court schedules sentencing for September 28, 2011, at 10:00 A.M. Court asks
Mr. Thompson how many witnesses he will have. Mr. Thompson advises the Court that
he does not anticipate having any witnesses, however the defense has identified 3
witnesses. Mr. Barker advises the Court that one of the witnesses will be the defendant.
Mr. Barker further advises the Court that the hearing will take an hour or two hours, at the
most.
Court requests Mr. Thompson to prepare an Order Denying the Motion to
Disqualify.
Court in recess at 10:54 A.M.

~
Dc.JH~.~GNER~
District Judge

Deputy Clerk - Christy L. Gering
COURT MINUTES - 2 of 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v..

)
)
)
)
)

DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
)
Defendant.
)
~~~~~~~~-)

COUNTY OF LATAH

Case No. CR-00-00260
. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
FOR CAUSE

On the 26th day of August, 2011, the defendant, DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
his counsel, D. Ray Barker, and the State's attorney, William W. Thompson, Jr., appeared
before the Court, at the Clearwater County Courthouse in Orofino, Idaho, for hearing of
the defendant's Motion for Disqualification for Cause. The Court heard arguments of
Counsel, reviewed the case file herein, directed statements to the Defendant and c·ounsel,
and HEREBY ORDERS Defendant's Motion for Disqualification for Cause BE DENIED for
reasons articulated by the Court on the record.
DATED this.

2.h~y of AV\~~ l-'- , 2011, nuncpro tunctoAugust26, 2011.
Joli.n R. Stegner
District Judge

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE: Page -1-

097

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE were served on the following in the
manner indicated below:
[]U.S. Mail
[ ] Overnight Mail
,H1<ax S8Z 7e,,,or
[ ] Hand Delivery

D. Ray Barker
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, ID 83843
William W. Thompson, Jr.
Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843'ZY
Dated this

Jtb

day of

[] U.S. Mail
[]Overnight Mail
[] Fax ·
_ , /..J.-!1{and Delivery

~

, 2011.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE: Page -2-
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D. RAY BARKER
Attorney at Law
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 1380
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,

v.

)
)
)
)
)

DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,

)
)

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Case No. CR-00-00260
MOTION FOR A SPECIFIC
SENTENCE

)
)

COMES NOW the Defendant, Dale C. Shackelford, by and through his attorney
of record, D. Ray Barker, and moves the Court for the imposition of a specific sentence.
The specific sentence hereby requested is an indeterminate life sentence with a fixed
term of ten years. The motion is based on the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion, filed June
11, 2011, Docket Number 37296, a copy of which is attached hereto. (A copy is also
attached to the State's Reply to "Defendant's Response to Notice of State's Decision to
Not Seek Death Penalty on Resentencing previously filed herein).

Motion For A Specific Sentence - 1
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In the Booth Opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court, at page 13, beginning on the
tenth line from the bottom of the page, states as follows:
In other words a defendant convicted of first-degree murder
automatically receives an indeterminate life sentence with a
fixed term of ten years ...
The Defendant is hereby requesting the sentence that the Idaho Supreme Court
has stated is automatic in these circumstances. The Defendant stands convicted of first
degree murder and the state is not seeking a death penalty which is the same
circumstances as existed in Booth.
Mr. Shackelford is simply requesting the sentence which the Idaho Supreme
Court has stated should be automatically imposed.
DATED this j

<Jfd day of
o. RaYBrker
Attorney for Respondent

Motion For A Specific Sentence - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the (:3ftt day of September, 2011, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid,
and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of
the office of or serving by facsimile:
William C. Thompson
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843
First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

Motion For A Specific Sentence - 3
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

STA TE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 37296
JAMES
Petitioner-Respondent,
Y.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respond en t-Ap pell ant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Boise, June 2011 Term
2011 Opinion No. 78
Filed: June 29, 2011

)
)
)

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Third. Judicial District of the State ofidaho,
Canyon County. The Honorable Gregory Culet, District Judge.
The district court's order, granting post-conviction relief, is affirmed.
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth
K. Jorgensen argued.
Law Offices of Van G. Bishop, Nampa, for respondent. Van G. Bishop argued.

J. JONES, Justice.·
The State ofidaho appeals the district court's order granting Trevor Booth's petition for
post-conviction relief on the ground that Booth received ineffective assistance of counsel. We
affirm.

I.
Factual and Procedural Background
On January 16, 2005, Leonard Kellum died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds that he
sustained at his residence. After an investigation, law enforcement suspected that Trevor Booth
was responsible for the shooting. Law enforcement based this conclusion on several pieces of
evidence obtained during the investigation. First, law enforcement dete1mined that the perpetrator
had entered Kellum's residence through the back door and shot him five times using an improvised
silencer made out of a plastic soda bottle. Law enforcement found a single set of footprints leading

102

from the back door of Kellum' s residence to the street, where neighbors said a black pickup truck
was parked at the time of the shooting. Booth, who owned a black pickup truck, told law
enforcement that he had driven to Kellum's residence on the moming Kellum was shot to pick up
marijuana that he planned to sell. Booth claimed he parked his pickup truck on the street and
approached the front door of the residence where he heard screaming and gunshots. Booth told law
enforcement that he left the residence after hearing the shots. However, before Kellum passed
away, he was transpmied to the hospital where he identified Booth as the person who had shot him.
Booth was subsequently charged with first-degree murder, and was represented by Richard
Harris. Although the crime of first-degree murder carries a potential penalty of death, 1 the State
declined to file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, thereby establishing that Booth's case
was a non-capital case. 2 During the time the case was pending, Harris met with Booth periodically
to discuss Booth's version of the events leading up to Kellum 's death. Although Booth initially
maintained that he did not commit the offense, he eventually acknowledged that he killed Kellum,
but asserted he did so in order to defend himself and his family. Booth told Harris that he was
actively involved in selling controlled substances and Kellum was his supplier. Booth explained
that he eventually fell behind in paying Kellum for the drugs he had supplied, and Kellum began
making threats of physical violence towards Booth, his family, and his girlfriend if he did not pay
the money owed.
Prior to trial, Gearld Wolff, the prosecutor handling Booth's case, informed Harris that he
intended to file a motion requesting that the Court provide a special verdict fom1 to be used by the
jury if Booth was convicted of first-degree murder. Specifically, the proposed verdict form would
instruct the jury to determine whether certain statutory aggravating circumstances delineated in LC.
§ 19-2515(9) 3 existed, including whether (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel,
manifesting exceptional depravity; (2) by the murder, or circumstances surrounding its

1

According to l.C. § 19-2515(1),
Except as provided in section 19-251 SA, Idaho Code, a person convicted of murder in the first
degree shall be liable for the imposition of the penalty of death if such person killed, intended a
killing, or acted with reckless indifference to human life, irrespective of whether such person
"directly committed the acts that caused death.
All statutory citations in this opinion will refer to those in effect at the time that Booth's criminal case was pending.
2
Pursuant to J.C. § 19-25 l 5(3)(a), a defendant convicted of a crime that is punishable by death cannot be sentenced
to death ul1less the State fi!qs a notice of intent to seek the death penalty.
3
1.C. § 19-2515(9) sets forth the list of statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which must be found to exist
beyond a reasonable doubt, before a sentence of death can bt? imposed.

2

103

commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life; or (3) the defendant, by prior
conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit
murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society. Wolff communicated to
Harris his understanding that pursuant to I.C. § 18-4004, the statute dealing with the penalties for
first-degree murder, the State could seek an instruction regarding statutory aggravating
circumstances even in a non-capital case. LC. § 18-4004 4 provides,
Subject to the provisions of sections 19-2515 and 19-2515A, Idaho Code, every
person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be punished by death or by
imprisonment for life, provided that a sentence of death shall not be imposed
unless the prosecuting attorney filed written notice of intent to seek the death
penalty as required under the provisions of section 18-4004A, Idaho Code, and
provided fmther that. whenever the death penalty is not imposed the court shall
impose a sentence. If a jury, or the comt if a jury is waived, finds a statutory
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt but finds that the imposition
of the death penalty would be unjust, the cmirt shall impose a fixed life sentence.
If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, does not find a statutory aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt or if the death penalty is not sought, the
court shall impose a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not
less than ten (10) years during which period of confinement the offender shall not
be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good
conduct, except for meritorious service. Every person guilty of murder of the
second degree is punishable by imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and the
imprisonment may extend to life.
Wolff interpreted this statute to mean that if the jury were to find any statutory aggravating
circumstances in a non-capital case, the comt would then be required to impose a fixed life
sentence.
After examining the statute, Harris agreed With Wolff's interpretation and believed Booth
would be subject to a fixed life sentence if the jury were to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a
statutory aggravating circumstance

existed~

Harris and Wolff subsequently met with the district

court judge prior to the scheduled pretrial conference to discuss the State's intent to request the
special verdict form. During this meeting, the parties discussed Wolff and Harris's mutual
understanding of LC. § 18-4004. The judge informed Wolff and Harris that the court would likely

4

LC. §§ 18-4004 and 19-2515 were amended in 2003 to reflect the requirement established by the United States
Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), that a jury, rather than a judge, find the necessary statutory
aggravating circumstances in a death penalty case. See 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 19, Res. 12510 Statement of
Purpose.
·

3
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use the special verdict form if it was requested by the State and supported by the evidence.
Thereafter, Harris prepared a memorandum to Booth outlining his understanding of the
potential penalties if Booth were to be convicted by a jury of first-degree murder. In the
memorandum, Harris set forth the text of LC. § 18-4004 and explained that,
What this statute means is that upon a conviction for first degree murder, if the jury
or judge if [a] jury is waived, finds a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt[,] the sentence is death. However, if the prosecutor does not seek
death, as is the case here, and if a statutory aggravating circumstance is found, then
the sentence is a fixed life sentence. That means the person sentenced will spend his
life in prison and will die there. At the pre-trial conference on Friday the Judge
indicated to the prosecutor and myself that he will submit a verdict form to the jury
that will ask the question of the jury: "Did Trevor Booth commit the crime of first
degree murder? Yes or No." The verdict form will also contain the same question
for second degree murder and for manslaughter. If the jury finds you guilty of first
degree murder, the verdict form will contain the further question for the jury: "do
you find beyond a reasonable doubt a statutory aggravating circumstance? Yes or
No." Since the trial judge intends to submit the question to the jury as part of the
verdict form and if the jury finds a statutory aggravating circumstance as part of the
verdict,. then the sentence to be imposed by the judge, notwithstanding all the
evidence there is in mitigation, [is] a fixed life sentence which means you will
spend the rest of your life in prison.
·
The memorandum goes on to explain what statutory aggravating circumstances the State intended
to prove. Harris mentioned that in his experience, "it is not too difficult for a finding to be made
that a murder is heinous (a murder by definition is considered heinous) atrocious or cruel or
alternatively that by committing the murder, the defendant showed utter disregard for life." Harris
also described, in. detail, all of the State's evidence against Booth, and explained "based upon the
evidence as currently presented, I believe the high probability is that the jury is going to return a
verdict of guilty." Finally, Harris advised Booth that his best option was to consider entering into a
plea agreement with the State.
The bottom line is this. If you go to jury trial, there is the very strong probability of
facing a fixed 1ife sentence. That means spending the rest of your life in prison. If
you enter a plea to murder with the prosecutor waiving aggravated circumstances,
or not requesting the court consider aggravated circumstances, then you would face
a minimum period of incarceration of ten years or whatever greater period the
judge[] might impose. I have indicated above I do not think the Judge would
impose a term greater tha[n] fifteen years followed by an indeterminate life. Life in
that context means thirty years. My recommendation is because of the strong risk of
spending the rest of your life in prison, a plea agreement may be your best option.
After giving the memorandum to Booth, Harris met with Booth's family members to
4

>
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explain and discuss the memorandum. Harris discussed with Booth's family the nuances of the
statutory aggravating circumstances and the risks associated with taking the case to trial. During
this time, Harris continued to negotiate with Wolff regarding a potential plea agreement.
Booth subsequently entered into a Rule 11 plea agreement with the State. Pursuant to the
plea agreement, Booth agreed fo plead guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for the State's
agreement not to pursue statutory aggravating circumstances as part of sentencing. The Rule l l
agreement was filed with the court on June 9, 2005, and Booth entered a plea of guilty on the same
day. After holding a sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Booth to an indeterminate life
sentence with thirty years fixed.
After a failed appeal challenging his sentence, 5 Booth timely filed a petition for postconviction relief. The court dismissed all of Booth's allegations in suppoti of his petition upon the
State's motion for summary dismissal, except for his allegations that (1) Harris used coerCive and
threatening tactics to get him to plead guilty by assuring him and his family that he would receive a
ten year fixed sentence if he pleaded guilty and a fixed life sentence if he took the case to trial; and
(2) Harris used the sentencing memorandum to coerce him into pleading guilty and was not
adequately prepared to go to trial even though Booth felt he "had nothing to loose [sic] by going to
trial."
After an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the district court concluded that Harris'
representation of Booth fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because Harris
erroneously advised Booth that he would be subject to a mandatory fixed life sentence if he went to
trial and the State's special verdict fonn was presented to the jury. According to the district court,
I.C. § 18-4004 clearly indicates that if Booth's case had gone to trial, and the jury had found an
aggravating circumstance, such a finding would "merely have been advisory in nature and the
court would not have been mandated to sentence Booth to a fixed life tenn, but would actually
have been bound only to sentence within the parameters of a life sentence, with any fixed portion
above ten years .... "The court also detennined that there was a reasonable probability that but for
HaiTis' erroneous interpretation of the statute, Booth would not have pleaded guilty and would
have proceeded to trial. Therefore, the district court granted Booth's petition for post-conviction
relief and ordered his guilty plea to be withdrawn and the case set for jury trial. The State timely
5

Booth appealed his sentence to the Court of Appeals, where his sentence was affirmed.

5
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appealed to this Court.

Issue on Appeal
I.

Whether the district court erred in granting Booth's petition for post-conviction relief
on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

III.
Discussion

A.

Standa1·d of Review

When reviewing a district court's decision to grant or deny a petition for post-conviction
relief following an evidentiary hearing, this Court will not disturb the district court's factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); State v. Murray, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828
P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed
question of law and fact. Murray, 121 Idaho at 921, 828 P.2d at 1326; Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984). When faced with a mixed question of fact and law, the Court will defer
to the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, but will exercise free
review over the application of the relevant law to those facts. Murray, 121 Idaho at 921-22, 828
P.2d at 1326-27.

B.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

"The right to counsel in criminal actions brought by the state of Idaho is guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho
State Constitution." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010). A claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure
act. Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 862, 243 P.3d 675, 678 (Ct. App. 2010). To prevail on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance
was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. McKeeth v. State, 140
Idaho 847, 850, 103 P.3d 460, 463 (2004); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This Court applies the

Strickland test when determining whether a defendant has received ineffective assistance of
counsel during the plea process. McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 850, 103 P.3d at 463. Before deciding
whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to "the effective assistance of competent counsel."

Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480-81 (2010). In this case, we conclude that the district
court did not err in determining that Harris' representation of Booth during the plea process was
deficient and that Booth was prejudiced as a result of such deficiency.
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l. Deficient Performance

On appeal, the State argues that Booth has not met his burden of demonstrating Harris'
performance was deficient because, even though the court ultimately concluded that Harris'
interpretation of LC. § 18-4004 was incorrect, his interpretation was nevertheless objectively
reasonable under the circumstances. According to the State, the reasonableness of Harris'
interpretation is supported by the fact that the prosecutor also believed that the statute would
require the court to impose a fixed life sentence in the event that the jury found a statutory
aggravating circumstance. The State further argues that the district court also appeared to agree
with HmTis' interpretation, given that it intended to provide the jury with a special verdict form
instructing them to consider whether a statutory aggravating circumstance had been proven.
Lastly, the State contends that Harris' memorandum demonstrates that Harris had carefully
reviewed the facts of the case, the evidence that would likely be admitted at trial, and the
applicable law, before advising Booth that his best option was to enter a plea of guilty and,
therefore, Harris' representation of Booth was not deficient.
In order to demonstrate the attorney's performance was deficient, the defendant has the
burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Strickland,
466 U.S. at 688. In doing so, the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel
was competent and diligent in his or her representation of the defendant. Schoger v. State, 148
Idaho 622, 624, 226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010). Furthermore, "tactical or strategic decisions of trial
counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate
preparation, ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation."

Howardv. State, 126 Idaho 231, 234, 880 P.2d 261, 264 (Ct .App. 1994). "Where a defendant is
represented by counsel during the plea process and enters a plea upon the advice of counsel, the
voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60, 106
P.3d 376, 386 (2004). Specifically a guilty plea is only valid where the plea represents a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.

Id.
. Although it appears that this Court has never dealt with the precise issue of whether a
defense attorney's erroneous interpretation of a sentencing statute constitutes deficient

7
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performance, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that when a statute
unambiguously sets forth a particular penalty, an attorney has a duty to provide correct advice
regarding such penalty. For example, in Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court held that an attorney
engaged in deficient perfonnance by failing to advise the defendant that his plea of guilty to drug
distribution made him. subject to automatic deportation because the consequences of the
defendant's guilty plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute. 130 S. Ct. at
1483. The Court reasoned that,
In the instant case, the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct,
clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla's
conviction .... Padilla's counsel could have easily determined that his plea would
make him eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the statute,
which addresses not some broad classification of crimes but specifically
commands removal for all controlled substances convictions except for the most
trivial of marijuana possession offenses. Instead, Padilla's counsel provided him
false assurance that his conviction would not result in his removal from this
country. This is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of
Padilla's plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his
deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel's advice was incorrect.

Id. (internal citations omitted). Although the Comi recognized that an attorney engages in
deficient performance by rendering advice that is inconsistent with the ·clear provisions of a
statute, the Court was careful to recognize that the result would not be the same where the law is
not as clear.
There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the
deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain. The duty of
the private practitioner in such cases is more limited. When the law is not succinct
and straightforward ... , a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise
a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse
immigration consequences. But when the deportation consequence is truly clear,
as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.

Id. Therefore, an attorney engages in deficient performance by rendering advice regarding
potential penalties during the plea process that is inconsistent with the plain and unambiguous
provisions of a sentencing statute. See also 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 422 ("The mere inaccuracy
of a prediction regarding sentence will not give rise to a claim for ineffective assistance, but a
gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome, combined with erroneous advice on the possible
effects of going to trial, falls below the required level of competence.")
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In this case, the district court did not err in finding that Harris' performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness due to his erroneous advice regarding the potential penalty
Booth would face if convicted at trial. Harris' interpretation of f.C. § 18-4004 is contrary to the
plain arid unambiguous language of the statute. I.C. § 18-4004 specifically provides that in firstdegree murder cases, "if the death penalty is not sought, the court shall impose a life sentence
with a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (I 0) years." The language of the
statute makes it clear that in cases where the State chooses not to seek the death penalty, the
court is required to impose an indetenninate life sentence with at least ten years fixed.
It appears that Harris based his interpretation on the first part of LC. § 18-4004, which
provides,
Subject to the provisions of sections 19-2515 and 19-251 SA, Idaho Code, every
person guilty of murder of the _first degree shall be punished by death or by
imprisonment for life, provided that a sentence of death shall not be imposed
unless the prosecuting attorney filed written notice of intent to seek the death
penalty as required under the provisions of section l 8-4004A, Idaho Code, and
provided further that whenever the .death penalty is not imposed the court shall
impose a sentence. If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, finds a statutory
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt but finds that the imposition
of the death penalty would be unjust, the court shall impose a fixed life sentence:
I.C. § 18-4004. However, Harris' interpretation is contrary to the plain language of this portion
of the statute as well. First and foremost, I.C. § 18-4004 specifically references LC. §§ 19-2515
and l 9-25 l 5A, which are both statutes that are only applicable in capital cases. LC. § 19-251 SA
prohibits the court from imposing the death penalty against a "mentally retarded person." I.C. §
19-2515A. Furthermore, I.C. § 19-2515 sets forth the procedures for holding a special sentencing
proceeding in capital cases 6 and articulates the instructions to be given to the jury during these
proceedings. 7 Finally, I.C. § 19-2515(9) goes on to lay out the various statutory aggravating

6

r.c.

§ 19-2515(5) provides,
If a person is adjudicated guilty of murder in the first degree, whether by acceptance of a plea of
guilty, by verdict of a jury, or by decision of the trial court sitting without a jury, and a notice of
intent to seek the death penalty was filed and served as provided in section 18-4004A, Icjaho Code,
a special sentencing proceeding shall be held promptly for the purpose of hearing all relevant
evidence and arguments of counsel in aggravation and mitigation of the offense .... The special
sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant
with the consent of the prosecuting attorney.
7
According to I.C. § 19-2515(7),
The jury shall be informed as follows:

9
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circumstances that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to justify the imposition
of the death penalty. I.C. § 19-2515(9). The lead··in to subsection 9 states, "[t]he following are
statutory aggravating circumstances, at least one (I) of which must be found to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt before a sentence of death can be imposed." LC. § 19-2515(9) (emphasis
added).
These statutory sections make clear that the provision m LC. § 18-4004 requiring the
jury, or the court if a jury is waived, to impose a fixed life sentence for a first-degree murder
conviction in the event that a statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt applies only to those cases where the death penalty is sought. Under the
statutory scheme, the court is only required to impose a fixed life sentence when (1) the State has
filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty; (2) the State seeks the death penalty; (3) the
defendant is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, first-degree murder; (4) a special sentencing
proceeding is held during which the jury, or the court if a jury is waived, determines that at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and (5) after
weighing any mitigating evidence against the statutory aggravating circumstances, the jury, or
the court if a jury is waived, finds that imposition of the death penalty is unjust. It is clear from
the relevant statutes that ~tatutory aggravating circumstances can only be sought in a death
penalty case. Because the State did not seek the death penalty in Booth's case, if Booth went to
trial and was convicted of first-degree murder, he would have been subject to an indeterminate
life sentence with at least ten years fixed, but not a mandatory fixed life sentence, as Harris

(a) If the jury finds that a statutory aggravating circumstance exists and no mitigating
circumstances exist which would make the imposition of the death penalty unjust, the defendant
will be sentenced to death by the court.
(b) ·If the jury finds the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance but finds that the
existence of mitigating circumstances makes the imposition of the death penalty unjust or the jury
cannot unanimously agree on whether the existence of mitigating circumstances makes the
imposition of the death penalty unjust, the defendant will be sentenced to a term of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole; and
(c) If the jury does not find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance or if the jury
cannot unanimously agree on the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, the defendant
will be sentenced by the court to a term of life imprisonment with a fixed term of not less than ten
(10) years.

10
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asserted. 8
Given that the information Harris provided when advising Booth to plead guilty to firstdegree murder was based on a blatantly erroneous reading of the sentencing statutes, the district
couit did not err in determining that Harris' performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Just as in Padilla, the potential

pena~ties

in Idaho for first-degree murder in a

nqn-capital case are clear from the statute and, therefore, Harris' duty to give correct advice in
that regard is equally clear. It cannot be said that Booth's plea was entered voluntarily when
HaiTis' advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.

Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 60, 106 P.3d at 386.
Moreover, the State's argument that Harris' interpretation of LC. § 18-4004 was
reasonable because the district judge and the prosecutor appeared to share the same interpretation
is without merit. Just because other parties shared Harris' erroneous interpretation of the statute
does not mean Harris' interpretation was reasonable, given that such an interpretation is contrary
to the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. Therefore, we find that Booth met his
burden of demonstrating that Harris' perfonnance was deficient.

2. Prejudice
The State argues that Booth has not met his burden of demonstrating he was prejudiced
by Harris' allegedly deficient performance because, even if Booth had insisted on going to trial,
he would have still been subject to the· same penalty as when he pleaded guilty. The State
contends that even if Booth went to trial in hopes of obtaining a conviction for second-degree
murder rather than first-degree murder, there no is reason to conclude that his sentence would
have been any different and, therefore, rejecting the plea agreement and proceeding to trial
would not have been rational under the circumstances. Rather, the State asserts that Booth's best
option was to plead guilty and request leniency from the court regarding the sentence.
In order to demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show "a reasonable probability that
the outCome of trial would be different but for counsel's deficient performance." McKay, 148
Idaho at 570, 225 P.3d at 703. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Id (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). When a defendant alleges
8
On appeal, the State does not argue that Harris' interpretation of the statutes was correct. The State offered such an
argument before the district court in support of its Motion to Reconsider. However, the same argument has not been
advanced on appeal.
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some deficiency in counsel's advice regarding a guilty plea, the defendant must demonstrate that
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial." Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925,
930 (2010) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
In this case, the district court did not err in determining that, but for Harris' erroneous
advice regarding the possibility of a fixed life sentence, Booth would have elected to proceed to
trial. It is clear from Harris' memorandum that he advised Booth to plead guilty because he
believed that there was a strong likelihood Booth would be convicted of first-degree murder and
would be subject to a fixed life sentence in the event that the jury also found a statutory
aggravating circumstance.
The bottom line is this. If you go to jury trial, there is the very strong probability
of facing a fixed life sentence. That i11eans spending the rest of your life in prison.
If you enter a plea to murder with the prosecutor waiving aggravated
circumstances, or not requesting the court consider aggravated circumstances,
then you would face a minimum period of incarceration of ten years or whatever
greater period the judge[] might impose .... My recommendation is because of
the strong risk of spending the rest ofyour life in prison, a plea agreement may be
your best option.
Moreover, the Rule 11 plea agreement was based entirely on Harris and Wolffs
erroneous interpretation of the statute. Booth pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in exchange
for the State's agreement not to seek "an aggravated circumstance as that term is referenced in
Idaho Code 18-4004." The Rule 11 agreement also required the court to refrain from making a
"finding of an aggravated circumstance as that term is used in Idaho Code 18-4004 for the
purposes of sentencing." Harris was unable to reach an agreement with the State on what the
recommended sentence would be at sentencing and, therefore, the plea agreement provided that
"the sentence to be imposed is reserved to the sound discretion of the Court." Thus, the sole
benefit that Booth received under the plea agreement was the State's agreement not to seek
aggravating circumstances-something Booth was never subject to in the first place.
Lastly, Booth filed an affjdavit in support of his petition for post-conviction relief,
wherein he stated that,
I pied guilty to First Degree Murder only after my attorney Richard Harris
threatened me with a Fixed Life Sentence if I insisted on going to trial. Mr. Harris
told me that the judge had told him that he would give the jury a special verdict
form asking for an aggravating fact and Mr. Harris told me as well as my family
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that the jury would find an aggravating factor and that the Court would then be
bound to sentence me to a fixed life sentence.
I wanted to go to trial and to prove that I did not intentionally shoot the victim. I
never wanted to plead guilty to the charge. I only plead [sic] guilty because Mr.
Hanis told me I would get a Fixed Life Sentence and that the Judge would be
bound to give it to me and if I plead [sic] guilty I would only get I 0 years.
When asked at the evidentiary hearing what had convinced him to plead guilty, Booth responded,
"[t]he fact that my attorney, the person who represented me, Richard Harris, repeatedly told me
that ifI did take this to trial, there is a huge chance that I would do life in prison .... I would die in
prison." Based on this evidence, the district court did not err in determining that but for Harris'
error, Booth would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
The State's arguments on appeal fail for several reasons. First, the State misstates the law
when arguing that "even if Booth would have insisted on going to trial in the hopes of obtaining
a conviction on second-degree murder rather than first-degree murder, Booth would have faced
the same potential penalty he believed he was subject to when he pled guilty to first-degree
murder, i.e., up to life with a minimum of ten years fixed." Contrary to the State's assertiOn, the
potential penalty for first:-degree murder differs significantly from the potential penalty for
second-degree murder. Under LC. § 18-4004, second-degree murder is "punishable by
imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and the imprisonment may extend to life." LC. § 184004. In contrast, following a conviction for first-degree murder, in cases where the death
penalty is not sought, the court is required to impose an indeterminate life sentence with a
minimum period of confinement of not less than ten years. LC. § I 8-4004. In other words, a
defendant convicted of first-degree murder automatically receives an indeterminate life sentence
with a fixed term often years, while a defendant convicted of second-degree murder only faces a
fixed term of ten years, with an undefined indeterminate term. Therefore, the State en-oneously
argues that Booth would have faced the same potential penalty if he were convicted of seconddegree murder after trial.
More importaiJtly, the State's arguments demonstrate a ftmdamental misunderstanding of
the law as it relates to the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. The State's ·arguments focus on
the fact that Booth has not demonstrated that the outcome of his case, specifically, his sentence,
would have been any different if he went to trial. However, in this context, the relevant inquiry is
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whether, but for Harris' errors, Booth would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial. Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676, 227 P.3d at 930. As this Court has previously noted, the
focus is "on the defendant's state of mind when choosing to plead guilty," and there is no
requirement that the Court speculate as to the potential sentence for a lesser charged offense
shou Id the jury con vi ct on that basis at retrial. McKee th, 140 Idaho at 853, I 03 P .3d at 466. Thus,
the State's arguments fail because they do not address Booth's state of mind when pleading
guilty or how his state of mind was affected by Harris' erroneous advice. 9 As mentioned above,
the evidence demonstrates that Booth would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial if were not for Harris' advice regarding the potential of a fixed life sentence.

IV.
Conclusion
The district court did not err in concluding that Booth met his burden of demonstrating
Harris' performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. Therefore, we affirm the
distriet court's decision to grant Booth's petition for post-conviction relief.

Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.

9

The State also appears to argue that Booth was not prejudiced because his best option was to plead guilty and
request leniency from the court based on the victim's mutual involvement in the drug community, his own drug
addiction at the time of the murder, and his assertion that he acted out of fear for the safety of himself and his
family. Although the State may be correct that Booth likely benefited by taking responsibility and pleading guilty to
the crime, such a factor is not relevant in determining whether Booth has met his burden of demonstrating prejudice.
As the United States Supreme Court has noted,
The nature of relief secured by a successful collateral challenge to guilty plea-an opportunity to
withdraw the plea and proceed to trial-imposes its own significant limiting principle. Those who
collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea.
Thus, a different calculus informs whether it is wise to challenge a guilty plea in a habeas
proceeding because ultimately, the challenge may result in a less favorable outcome for the
defendant, whereas a collateral challenge to conviction obtained after a jury trial has no similar
potential downside.
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485-86 (emphasis in original). Therefore, the fact that Booth may have benefited by pleading
guilty instead of going to trial is not relevant to whether he was prejudiced by Harris' deficient performance.

a
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D. RAY BARKER
Attorney at Law
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 1380
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LATAH
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
v.
)
)
)
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
)
Defendant
)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)
STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR-00-00260
NOTICE OF HEARING ON
MOTION FOR A SPECIFIC
SENTENCE

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will call on for hearing the
Defendant's Motion for a Specific Sentence at the Clearwater County Courthouse, 150
Michigan Avenue, Orofino, Idaho, on the 28th day of September, 2011, at the hour of
10:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.
DATED this 13th day of September, 2011.

NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR
A SPECIFIC SENTENCE - 1
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day of September, 2011, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing documents was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, and
or leaving with a person in charge of the
addressed to, or by personally delivering
office of or serving by facsimile:
William W. Thompson
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843
[ ]

f<l

[ ]

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile (208) 883-2290

By:

NOTICE OF HEARINU ON MOTION FOR
A SPECIFIC SENTENCE - 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
' .

vs.

DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2000-260

ORDER FOR TRANSPORT

~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

It is ORDERED that Dale Carter Shackelford be transported from the Idaho
Correctional Institution in Orofino, Idaho, to the Clearwater County Courthouse for
his resentencing hearing at 10:00 A.M. on September 28, 2011.
DATED this 26th day of September 2011.
~

~Y'\{\~

J~n R. Stegner
District Judge

ORDER FOR TRANSPORT - 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that a full, true
complete and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER FOR TRANSPORT was transmitted
by facsimile to:

D. RAY BARKER
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
882-7604

CLEARWATER COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
208-476-7835

and hand delivered to:
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR.
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
and sent by PFD email to:
IDAHO CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
OROFINO, IDAHO
icio@idoc.idaho.gov
BRETT PHILLIPS.
IDAHO STATE BOARD OF CORRECTION
bphillips@idoc.idaho.gov

ORDER FOR TRANSPORT - 2
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33
D. RAY BARKER
Attorney at Law
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 1380
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICl OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-00-00260
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

)
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.

)
)

)

The Defendant has filed a Motion for a Specific Sentence which is set for hearing
at the same time as the sentencing hearing at 10:00 a.m. on September 28, 2011. That
motion is based on the quote from the Opinion in the case of State v. Booth, a copy of
which is attached to that motion. The specific quote is as follows:
"In other words a defendant convicted of first degree murder
automatically receives an indeterminate life sentence with a
fixed term of ten years ... "
Based on that statement, the Defendant has asked the court to impose a
sentence of life imprisonment with a fixed term of ten years. The Defendant is asking
the court to specifically follow the directive of the Idaho Supreme Court.

Resentencing Memorandum - 1
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The State on the other hand, has asked the court to impose consecutive
sentences of fixed life which is the equivalent of life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole. The imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole would be
contrary to the holding in Booth. Booth was a non-capital case. In Booth, the Supreme
Court found that the defense counsel was ineffective because he advised Mr. Booth that
if he went to trial and was convicted of first degree murder, the court could make a
finding of the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance and if it did then the
court would be required to impose a fixed life sentence. The Court found this to be an
erroneous interpretation of Idaho Code Section 18-4004. The Court went on to state at
page 10 of the Opinion as follows:
"It is clear from the relevant statutes that statutory
aggravating circumstances can only be sought in a death
penalty case. Because the State did not seek the death
penalty in Booth's case, if Booth went to trial and was
convicted of first degree murder, he would have been
subject to an indeterminate life sentence with at least ten
years fixed, but not a mandatory fixed life sentence ... "
Since the state has decided to not seek a death sentence in this case, Mr. Shackelford
is in the same situation as Mr. Booth and therefore pursuant to the above quote, is
subject to an indeterminate life sentence with at least ten years fixed.
In a death penalty case, a Defendant has a constitutional right to have a jury
make a finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance before he can be
sentenced to a fixed life sentence. The State cannot be allowed to circumvent that right
by declining to seek a death penalty but at the same time seeking a fixed life sentence.
The State is asking the court to impose a sentence of fixed life without having to prove
an aggravating circumstance simply by declining to seek a death penalty. Aggravating

Resentencing Memorandum - 2
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circumstances can only be sought in a death penalty case. A sentence of fixed life can
be imposed only on a finding of a statutory aggravating factor.

Therefore the court

cannot impose a sentence of fixed life in this case but can only impose an indeterminate
life sentence with at least ten years fixed. However, the Idaho Supreme Court in Booth
has further limited the permissible sentence with the first quote stated above which says
that a Defendant convicted of first degree murder automatically receives an
indeterminate sentence with a fixed term of ten years.

The defense contends that,

based on that quote, the court shall impose a sentence of 10 years fixed with an
indeterminate term of life. In the alternative, if the court elects to not follow the directive
of the Idaho Supreme Court as stated in that quote, then the sentence must be an
indeterminate term of life with a fixed term of not less than 10 years.
In the original trial there was evidence submitted that Donna Fontaine was killed
as a result of a gunshot wound to the back of the neck. In argument during the trial, the
prosecuting attorney characterized the event as an execution. At that time, the defense
was without sufficient information to contest either the evidence or the characterization
given by the prosecutor. Subsequent to the trial, new evidence was obtained in the
post-conviction

relief

proceeding

which

refutes

both

the

evidence

and

the

characterization. It was discovered that only about two-thirds of the bullet was found in
the victim's neck and the other one-third was· simply missing.

Please find attached

hereto and, designated as Exhibit A, an Affidavit of Doctor Roderick Saxey, dated May
5, 2005.

Dr. Saxey reviewed the radiographs of the victim and determined that the

bullet in the neck region was deformed and appeared to have been sheared off and no
smaller fragments were in the region.

Resentencing Memorandum - 3

He concluded that it was unlikely that the
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deformity could have occurred in the cervical spine without substantial damage to the
vertebrae or fragmentation (neither of which occurred) and he concluded that the
deformity may have been caused by a ricochet off a hard object prior to entry into the
body. A ricochet is totally inconsistent with an execution and the lack of damage to the
vertebrae puts into question whether the gunshot wound was the cause of death. It
should also be pointed out that the radiographs (x-rays) which Dr. Saxey examined
were withheld from the defense in the discovery process. Had they been provided by
the defense this matter would have been raised at trial.

Please see attached hereto

and, designated as Exhibit B, the Addendum to [Successive] Petition for Post
Conviction Relief which, at pages two through five, provides additional information
regarding the x-rays.
For purposes of this resentencing, the defense submits that there is no evidence
of an execution and, that the evidence, had it been provided to the defense, would have
refuted the characterization made by the State.
In prior proceeding, Dale has been criticized for being manipulative and for being
inclined to use violence.
There are two entries from the records of the Larue D. Carter Memorial Hospital,
a children's home in which he resided when he was nine years old, which relate to
those characteristics. The first is from a Treatment Review dated February 23, 1971,
which is attached hereto and designated as Exhibit C.
statement:
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It contains the following

"Efforts shall continue in the direction of
increasing self-esteem, using verbalization to
express appropriate anger, learning to share
people and things, and trying, and trying to
teach him to manipulate more effectively."
[Emphasis added].
The second record is from the same facility and is under the title Nurse Notes
and is attached hereto and designated as Exhibit D. It states as follows:
Was
"Much aggressive play w/ Mark.
permitted to hit Kevin who was constantly
provoking Dale.
Dale misunderstood and
kicked Kevin in the stomach. Dale was told
that if he plans to fight in the future, he must
use his bare hands."
These two entries show that at a very young age, Dales was taught to
manipulate and to use violence.

The very characterization which are the basis of

criticism today were fostered and encouraged by these who provided his daily care after
his parents had abandoned him.

This is not presented as a justification, but as an

explanation and as a basis for understanding.
The defense requests that the Court impose a sentence of indeterminate life with
a fixed term of 10 years consistent with the Booth Opinion. If the court declines to do so
then, in the alternative, the defense would request a fixed term of confinement, which
would allow Mr. Shackelford a reasonable expectation of being eligible for parole while
he is young enough to be able to support himself.

It is being asked that Mr.

Shackelford's future be placed within the control of the parole board and that the rest of
his life not be cast in stone.
DATED this

g71'1

day of

Septemb~~
D. Ray
rker
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

;J 7th day of September, 2011, a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
and correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage
prepaid, and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in
charge of the office of or serving by facsimile:
William W. Thompson
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843

[]

M
[]

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

f)£µ1~~
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Affidavit
J, Roderick Saxey, MD, based on radiographs submitted to me for review~ do solemnly
affirm the following:
1. The bullet seen as a metallic foreign body on tadiographs of Victim A, in the r.egio.n of
the neck, is deformed and appears to have been sheared off. No smaller bullet :fragr.oents
are in this region.

2. It is unlikely that this deformity could have occun:ed in the cervical spine without
substantial damage to the vertebrae or fragmentation of the bullet.
3. The cause of the deformity and shearing is not evident on the radiographs and may
have been caused by ricochet off a hard object prior to en:l:r.y into the body.

,

~CtJ ~

Roderick

Saxe;~ l\/JJ

.DATE.Dthis

RI.BED AND SWORN to before me this.;;;;-day of .

t;._,.t_/

. '

J7k¢1. ==

, 2005.

0

,/JJ;L'W.al"-.4""""(!,___
Notary Public :ror
'

Residing at:

Washington

,//

'';--;;.~d ~

My commission Expires:

,!/-/.,;}-:;di
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IANAPOLIS,, TIJDIAJ:TA

DATE:

T!lEATM.ENT Rb\TIEW

1

RX SESSIONS

I

NAME.

DATE vr· 1_,AS'.1 CONF : none

AGE

Pr: Dale 1 Shackelford
9
}10: Carolyn Shackelford 27

EA.; Carter 812§.ckelford

28

THERAPIST.

SilJCE LAS.T
CONFERENCE

Richard ncNabb, MoD.
Judy Gustafson,ACSW
Jud;y: Gustafson ,.ACSW

14
6
6

TOTAL

14

HOME ADDRESS

4059

North Temple

6
Indianapolis,
,___6_______In_d1_·a_n_a_ __

SIBLINGS:

AGE
.7

Kathy Shackelford
Betsy Shackelford
John Shackelford
REASON'

FOR

6

5

CONFERENCE:

Routine Treatment Review
DATE OF ADMISSION :

9-24-70

. MAIN COMPLAINTS UPON ADMISSION:

_Cheating, lying, stealing, declining school performance, sexual pre-occupation, aggressive
acting out hostility toward sibs and peers.
SUMMARY OF FAMILY PSYCHOPATHOLOGY:

Dale is the oldest of six children in the home. The other five are his, hers,and ours •
. Dale 1 s natural parents were divorced when he was 4 and from then. until he was 7 lie lived
with his mother in what sounds like a, completely chaotic and unpredictable enviornment.
Since father regained custody and another mother figure was introduced it appears that
the patient 1 s adjustment has constantly deteriorated. Probably the_ pricipitating event
f'or ultimate decompensation ·was birth of half:--brother in August 1969. Without a source_
of emotional gratification·, an appropr:i,ate masculine f'igure to identify 1rtlth·, an inconsistent enviornment to confyse him,Dale regressed to a depressed,.-impulse ridden, prepsychotic boy.
·
INDIVJ])UAL PSYCHOTHERAPY:

· Dale was picked up after his .previous therapist ·left in January. He has been se·en twice
a week since then a total of 14 sessions. Ue ha9 re~ated
the therapist in a warm
and compliant manner and has been llultra co-ope1~ative 11 • He is able to talk about his
anger at having to share his father with anyone especially step-mother, his anger and
. frustration at what seems a dual set of rules fro him· (when father is in t:P.e home and
when he is not, ·and his sense of complete fear of. abandonment by anyone and everyone
who he likes. His very good manners and his. degree· o:f co-operation seem to be aJ.most
a counter-phobic mechanism. He tries very hard to please when he knows the lim.i.ts and
rules. He is very proud of any eviden_c~ of reward i.e. a pass; a trip to the snak bar
etc. He has very ambiva1ent feelings about his parents and whether or not he returns
to them is questionable. Recently there has been efforts at manipulating the therapi::;t.
against other authority figui'es. The patient shows. promise of being able to learn effective ~anipulative tec:hniques. Efforts shall continue in the direction of increasing

to

,._

self esteem, using verbalization to express appropriate. anger, learning to share people
and things, and trying, and trying to teach him to manipulate mQre effectively.
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LARlfE

MEMORIAL HO;:;PITAL
Indianapolis

NURSES NOTES

II

PRECAUTIONS

id

f

I AHoult

E~cope
3.4

)iet

II

l

Building

Medication

4-12

RESPONSIBILITY STATUS

I

Ground

Time and Initial

Dose & Method

Eating Habits

Ae:tivl1ies

Time or Description

),. Visit

Conferance

Visitors
laboratory

D1ognostic Tests

-!ST

Recreafionol Therapy

Stogc II

Industrial Therapy

EST
Time

Snock Bar

To!ol Time

Minutes Today

Occvpo tionol Theropy

Ill

1

I

I

Weight

T PR

Ill

Stoge ti

B/P

Time

Elimination

B/P

T PR

Othea

Time

BEHAVIOR NOTES

~

;'

/1

.•

-

Doy

NAME

c/

I

X<'onth

/

t::,/
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
COURT MINUTES
Sheryl L. Engler
Court Reporter
Recording in Orofino 488-1
Time: 10:32 A.M.

John R. Stegner
District Judge
Date: September 28, 2011
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.
Subject of Proceedings:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

CR-2000-00260

APPEARANCES:
William W. Thompson, Jr., Prosecutor
Appearing on behalf of the State
Defendant present with counsel,
D. Ray Barker, Moscow, ID

RESENTENCING HEARING

Prior to convening, Defendant's Exhibit A, undated letter from Misti Jones, was
marked.
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for a resentencing hearing
on Counts I and II of the Indictment in this case following remand from the Supreme
Court, Court noted the presence of counsel and the defendant.
Court reviewed the prior proceedings conducted in this case, including the charge
of Murder in the First Degree and the maximum penalty prescribed by law.
Mr. Barker had no oral argument in support of defendant's Motion for a Specific
Sentence, but relied on his written submissions in support of the motion. Mr. Thompson
argued in opposition to the defendant's motion. For reasons articulated on the record,
Court rejected the defendant's position on sentencing, denying the motion and finding
that the maximum penalty for the chm·ge in each of the two counts before the Court at this
hearing, Murder in the First Degree, is not less than ten years nor more than life in the state
penitentiary.
Court stated that an Update to the Presentence Report had been received and

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
COURT MINUTES - 1

139

reviewed by the Court, inquiring if counsel had received a copy thereof and had
opportunity to review the same, to which both responded in the affirmative, Mr. Barker
stating that he had sufficient opportunity to review the Presentence Report with the
defendant. Mr. Barker had nothing to offer by way of rebuttal or in explanation of the
information contained in the Addendum to the Presentence Report, other than what he
had already submitted in writing.
No victim(s) appeared to make an under oath statement as provided by§ 19-5306,
Idaho Code. Mr. Thompson referred the Court back to the aggravation testimony from
the original sentencing proceedings and the letter from Shanna Hathman, victim Dom1a
Fontaine's, daughter, which was filed as an addendum to the Update to the Presentence
Report. Court was at ease for a few moments to review the letter.
Defendant's Exhibit A, undated letter from Misti Jones, was identified, offered and
admitted into evidence without objection. Court was at ease to read the letter.
Jerald Miller was called, sworn and testified for the defendant via telephone. No
cross examination.
Jackye Squire-Leonard was called, sworn and testified for the defendant. Cross
examination by Mr. Thompson. No redirect examination. There being no objection from
counsel, the witness was excused.
Defendant made an unsworn statement to the Court regarding the DOR' s listed in
the Update to the Presentence Report.
In response to inquiry from the Court, the State had no testimony or other evidence
to present in aggravation of punishment.
Mr. Barker directed statements to the Court in mitigation of and in recommendation
of punishment.
Defendant made a statement to the Court in his own behalf.
Mr. Thompson directed statements to the Court in aggravation of and in
recommendation of punishment.
Court asked if the defendant had any lawful cause to show why judgment should
not be pronounced against him. Mr. Barker replied, stating that no such lawful cause
existed.

Terry Odenborg
· Deputy Clerk
COURT MINUTES - 2
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Based upon the finding of guilt of the defendant by a jury, Court found the
defendant guilty of the felony offense of Murder in the First Degree of Donna Fontaine as
charged in Count I of the Indictment on file in this case and ordered that he stand
convicted thereof. Court sentenced the defendant to the custody of the Idaho State Board
of Correction for a fixed life term.
Based upon the finding of guilt of the defendant by a jury, Court found the
defendant guilty of the felony offense of Murder in the First Degree of Fred Palahniuk as
charged in Count II of the Indictment on file in this case and ordered that he stand
convicted thereof. Court sentenced the defendant to the custody of the Idaho State Board
of Correction for a fixed life term, to run consecutive to the sentence in Count I.
Court informed defendant of his right to appeal.
Defendant was remanded to the custody of the Clearwater County Sheriff pending
delivery to an authorized agent of the Idaho State Board of Correction for execution of
sentence.
Court recessed at 11:41A.M.

APPROVED BY:

~~

JOHN R. STEGNER
DISTRICT JUDGE

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk

COURT MINUTES - 3
.

'
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,

THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

COURTLOG -

John R. Stegner
District Judge

Sheryl L. Engler
Court Reporter
Recording in Orofino 488-1
Time: 10:32 AM .

Date: September 28, 2011
. STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

CR-2000-00260

APPEARANCES:
William W. Thompson, Jr., Prosecutor
Appearing on behalf of the State
Defendant not present, represented by
D. Ray Barker, Moscow, ID

--------------------------------------------------------------Subject of Proceedings:

RESENTENCING HEARING
EXHIBITS

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS:
Defendant's Exhibit A, undated letter from Misti Jones-in evidence 09-28-2011

WITNESSES
FOR THE DEFENDANT:

Jerald Miller
Jackye Squire-Leonard
Dale Carter Shackelford - unsworn statement regarding DORs listed in Update to PSI

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
COURT MINUTES
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
DOB:
SSN:
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-00-00260
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
ON RESENTENCING - ·
COUNTS I AND II

~~~~~~~~-)

On the 28th day of September, 2011, the defendant, DALE CARTER
SHACKELFORD, defendant's counsel, D. Ray Barker, and the State's attorney, William W.
Thompson, Jr., appeared before this Court for resentencing on Counts I and II of the
Amended Indictment filed herein.

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON
RESENTENCING - COUNTS I AND II: Page -1-

'144

On December 22, 2000, a jury returned verdicts finding the defendant guilty of the
following felony offenses: Count I - MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, Idaho Code 184001, 4003, committed on or about the 29th day of May, 1999; Count II - MURDER IN THE
FIRST DEGREE, Idaho Code 18-4001, 4003, committed on or about the 29th day of May,
1999; Count III - ARSON IN THE FIRST DEGREE, Idaho Code 18-802, committed on or
about the 29th day of May, 1999; Count IV -CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER IN
THE FIRST DEGREE, Idaho Code 18-4001, 4003, 18-1701, committed on or about the 25th to
29th days of May, 1999; CountV - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ARSON IN THE FIRST
DEGREE, Idaho Code 18-802, 18-1701, committed on or about the 25th to 29th days of May,
1999; and Count VI - PREPARING FALSE EVIDENCE, Idaho Code 18-2602, committed
during a period of time between August, 1999, and January 24, 2000; FELONIES IN A
TOTAL OF SIX(6) COUNTS.
On October 25, 2001, the following sentences were imposed: Count I- Death; Count
II - Death; Count III - commitment to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction for
a fixed period of twenty-five (25) years; Count IV - commitment to the custody of the Idaho
State Board of Correction for a fixed period of life; Count V - commitment to the custody of
the Idaho State Board of Correction for a fixed period of twenty-five (25) years; Count VI commitment to the custody of th~ Idaho State Board of Correction for a fixed period of five

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON
RESENTENCING - COUNTS I AND II: Page -2-
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(5) years.
Pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, in its Substitute
Opinion dated June 1, 2010, the District Court's grant of post-conviction relief, which set
aside the sentences imposed in Counts I and II on October 25, 2001, was upheld and the
case was remanded to the District Court for resentencing on Counts I and II. . The
convictions on all six (6) counts were upheld as were the sentences on Counts III, IV, V and
VI.

The Court, having considered the update to Presentence Investigation Report filed
herein, the evidence, if any, of circumstances in aggravation and in mitigation of
punishment, the arguments of counsel and any statement of the defendant, thereupon
asked the defendant if there was any legal cause to show why judgment should not be
pronounced at this time to which defendant replied that there was none.
Good cause appearing,
The Court finds ~hatthe said defendant, DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, having
been found guilty of the crime of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, in violation of Idaho
Code 18-4001, 4003, a felony, as stated in Count I of the Amended Indictment is hereby is
committed to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction for a fixed period of LIFE.
The Court further finds that the said defendant, DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON

RESENTENCING - COUNTS I AND II: Page -3-
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having been found guilty of the crime of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, in violation of
Idaho Code 18-4001, 4003, a felony, as stated in Count II of the Amended Indictment, is
hereby is committed to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction for a fixed
period of LIFE.
PROVIDED FURTHER, the sentences imposed above shall all run consecutively
with each other and with the sentences previously imposed in Counts III, IV, V and VI.
The defendant shall receive credit against such sentences for time served in the
amount of four thousand two hundred forty five (4,245) days.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court, Latah County, deliver two
(2) certified copies of the JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION to the Sheriff of Latah County,
one to serve as a commitment of the defendant to the Idaho State Board of Correction, and
one to be delivered by the Sheriff of Latah County to the appointed agents of the Idaho
State Board of Correction when the defendant is delivered to such agents' custody.
DATED this

h ~ayof

0(....ft>lx/ 2011,nuncprotunctoSeptember28,2011.

J~R. Stegner
District Judge

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON
RESENTENCING - COUNTS I AND II: Page -4-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete and correct copies of the foregoing
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON RESENTENCING - COUNTS I AND II were
delivered to the following as indicated:

on this

D. Ray Barker
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9048
Moscow, ID 83843

~.S.Mail

William W. Thompson, Jr.
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843

[]U.S. Mail
[ ] Overnight Mail
[]Fax
~nd Delivery

[ ] Overnight Mail
[]Fax
[ ] Hand Delivery

Karen Johnson, Records
Latah County Sheriff's Office
Latah County Courthouse
.Moscow, ID 83843

[]U.S. Mail
[ ] Overnight Mail
[]Fax
:)4: Hand Delivery

Lt. Ron Manell
Latah County Jail
Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843

[]U.S. Mail
[ ] Overnight Mail
[]Fax
'j?fhland Delivery

Idaho DOC - Central Records
E-mail: centralrecords@idoc.idaho.gov

~-Mail

Idaho DOC- Dist 2 Probation & Parole
E-mail: Dist2@idoc.idaho.gov

_}4J]-Mail

Idaho DOC - CCD Sentencing Team
E-mail: CCDSentencingD2@idoc.idaho.gov

~Mail

Co~ay of O~r

SUSAN PETERSEN
Latah County Clerk of the Court .

,20Jl_.
r".. \.·A A~ ...
By:_ _
~--='----JJ\J.JU--='--l.JV~
Deputy Clerk

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON
RESENTENCING - COUNTS I AND II: Page -5-
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:2
(F
L.

D. RAY BARKER
Attorney at Law
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 1380
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-00-00260

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

TO:
TO:

TO:

CLERK OF THE COURT
THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT STATE OF IDAHO, AND ITS ATTORNEY
WILLIAM THOMPSON, JR.
PO BOX 8068
MOSCOW, IE> 83843
LAWRENCE WASDEN, ATTORNEY GENERAL
PO BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0010
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named appellant Dale C. Shackelford, appeals against the

above-named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment and
Conviction on Resentencing- Counts I and II entered in the above-entitled action on
September 28, 2011, the Honorable Judge John R. Stegner presiding.

Notice of Appeal - 1

14~

2.

Defendant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the

judgment described in paragraph I above is an appealable judgment under and
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 11(c)(1)(6).
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues which the appellant may assert on

appeal is as follows:
a.

Appellant appeals the sentence imposed in this matter;

b.

Appellant appeals the denial of the Motion to Disqualify Judge
Without Cause

c.

Appellant appeals the denial of the Defendant's Motion for
Disqualification of Judge for Cause

d.

Appellant appeals the denial of the Motion for a Specific Sentence.

e.

The District Judge erred by imposing an excessive sentence in this
matter.

f.

The District Judge erred by making findings based on testimonial
hearsay from the Presentence Report.

4.

a.

A reporter's transcript is requested;

b.

Transcripts of the following hearings or proceedings are requested:
Hearing on June 20, 2011 with Court Reporter Sheryl
Engler present.

Transcript for this hearing is estimated at two

pages.
Hearing on July 1, 2011 with Court Reporter Sheryl Engler
present. Transcript for this hearing is estimated at two pages.

Notice of Appeal - 2

••
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Hearing on August 26, 2011, with Court Reporter Sheryl
Engler present. Transcript for this hearing is estimated to be three
pages.
Hearing on September 28, 2011, with Court Reporter Sheryl
Engler present. Transcript for this hearing is estimated to be six
pages.
5.

The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the

Clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, l.A.R.:
NONE
6.

I certify:
a.

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal was served on the Court
Reporter;

b.

That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript
fee because Appellant is indigent, without funds,

and the

undersigned counsel has been appointed to represent the
Defendant.
c.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to I.AR. 20 and the Attorney General of the State of
Idaho.

DATED this

2.Dflt

day of

r{).,,ffJ b6-...-

I

2011.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

[)~

D. RaYBfKet=
Notice of Appeal - 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

, 2011, a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2!Jfh day of tJcfn tfZ..,,.and correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage
prepaid, and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in
charge of the office of or serving by facsimile to the following:
William W. Thompson
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843
[]

kl
[]

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

Attorney General
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
P<J
[]
[]

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

Court Reporter Sheryl Engler at her box at the Latah County Courthouse
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D. RAY BARKER
Attorney at Law
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 1380
IN THE DISTRiCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.

DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-00-00260

MOTION TO APPOINT STATE
APPELLANT PUBLIC DEFENDER

)
Defendant.
)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Dale C. Shackleford, by and through his attorney
of record, D. Ray Barker, and hereby moves the Court to appoint the Office of the State
Appellate Public Defender to represent the above-named Defendant in the pending
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court/Court of Appeals.

This motion is based on Mr.

Shackelford's indigency and records and files of this case.
DATED this

}{0£ day of -~&~c~-t~tP~b~""~,...----' 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

{4

day of {!,,f:'"'ff!J /Je.,,--, 2011, a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2C>
and correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage
prepaid, and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in
charge of the office of or serving by facsimile to the following:
William W. Thompson
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843
[]
l><J

[]

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

Attorney General
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

N
[]
[]

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

State Appellate Public Defender
3050 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703
[><J

[]
[]

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

D. Ray/Barker
Attorney at Law
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D. RAY BARKER
Attorney at Law
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 1380
· IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
v.
)
)
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
)
)
Defendant.
)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~->

Case No. CR-00-00260
ORDER APPOINTING STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

After reviewing the records and files herein and after considering the Motion to
Appoint State Appellate Public Defender and being fully advised in the premises;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender
is appointed to represent the above-named Defendant in the pending appeal to the
Idaho Supreme Court/Court of Appeals;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that D. Ray Barker shall continue to represent the
above-named Defendant in all other aspects of this case, subject to further order of this
Court.

2 I )t'

DATED this .

day of

0 <..-to~e-v-

'2011.

~vW'-')~
e

Ju

Order Appointing State
Appellate Public Defender - 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

()c~ ,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of
2011, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage
prepaid, and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in
charge of the office of or serving by facsimile to the following:
William W. Thompson
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843
[]

)K'
[]

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

State Appellate Public Defender
3050 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703

{f
[]

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

Attorney General
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

;rf-[]
[]

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

D. Ray Barker
Attorney at Law
PO Box 9408
Moscow, ID 83843

it[J

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

By:

Clerk of the Court

Order Appointing State
Appellate Public Defender - 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

)
)

Supreme Court No. 39398-2011

)
)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
RE: EXHIBITS

)
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant/ Appellant.

)
)

)

~~~~~~~~)

I, Ranae Converse, Deputy Court Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Latah, do hereby certify that the
Transcript of the Status Conference held on June 20, 2011, the Transcript of the Status
Conference held on July 1, 2011, the Transcript of the Motion to Disqualify held on
August 26, 2011, the Transcript of the Resentencing Hearing held on September 28, 2011,
the Update to the Presentence Investigation Dated March 6, 2001, and the Addendum to
the Updated Presentence Investigation Dated August 4, 2011, will be lodged with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Appellate Rules and will be lodged as
exhibit as provided by Rule 31(a)(3), IAR.
IN WITNESS WHERE<?F, I e;~ave hereunt°J set m:y hand and affixed the seal of
.
said Court at Moscow, Idaho this I .J day of,~1~ JJLJJ/1 A~.c
,

Susan R. Petersen, Clerk of the
District Court, Latah County, ID

By
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/ Respondent,
vs.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant/ Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court Case No. 39398-2011

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

~~~~~~~~-)

I, Ranae Converse, Deputy Court Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Latah, do hereby certify that the
clerk's record in the above entitled cause and will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of

said Court at Moscow, Idaho this
Susan R. Petersen, Clerk of the
District Court, Latah County, ID

By
Deputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/ Respondent,
vs.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,

)

)
)
)

Supreme Court Case No.

39398-2011

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)
)
)

)
Defendant/ Appellant.

)

~~~~~~~~-)

I, Ranae Converse, Deputy Court Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Latah, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by United
States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the attorneys of record in this cause as follows:
LAWRENCE WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
POBOX83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0010

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOISE, ID. 83703

IN WITNE.SS ~EREOF, J haye,.~~r;'!nto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at
/ Y day of ''1 J?}Ylu lUU.J , 20
Moscow, Idaho this -1-I
Susan R. Petersen, Clerk of the
District Court, Latah County, ID

Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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